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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. IS THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPLE AVAILABLE 
AS A DEFENSE TO THE PAYMENT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT? 
II. DOES THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
RECEIVED AT TRIAL SUPPORT THE FINDING 
OF THE COURT BELOW THAT THE RESPONDENT 
HAD REASONABLY RELIED ON AN ORAL AGREEMENT 
MADE, TO HIS DETRIMENT. TO REDUCE CHILD 
SUPPORT, ENTITLING HIM TO AN ESTOPPEL 
DEFENSE? 
III. DID THE COURT BELOW COMMIT AN ERROR OF 
LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE REVISED CHILD 
SUPPORT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER, 1980, 
EXCUSED THE RESPONDENT FROM HIS CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION, AND THAT THE APPELLANT 
COULD WAIVE A PROSPECTIVE CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL? 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision of Third District Court 
Judge Scott Daniels on a petition to modify a decree of divorce. 
The appellant, custodial parent, Carol Blackburn (Moyes), asks this 
court to reverse the lower court's decision to deny her a judgment 
for arrearages in child support, 
EXPLANATION OF ENDNOTES 
The proceedings below were not transcribed all at once. 
The testimony of the appellant, Carol Moyes, on March 5th and 6 th, 
1985, was prepared first. The testimony of the respondent, Robert 
Blackburn, was transcribed separately at a later time. Both 
transcripts are attached as appendices. The pages of each 
transcript are numbered separately. The endnotes refer to these 
transcripts separately. 
The appellant's argument on issue number two is fact 
intensive. There are so many endnotes that to include them in the 
text would be disruptive to the text. The endnotes appear on a 
separate endnote page at the end of the statement of facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Carol Blackburn Moyes, defendant-appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as "appellant") and Robert Ferris Blackburn, Jr., 
plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter "respondent") were divorced in 
the State of Colorado in December, 1978.1 
The Colorado divorce decree stated that respondent was to 
pay $440.00 per month child support.2 The separation agreement, 
on which the decree of divorce was based, explained that the 
$440.00 per month child support was to be paid by respondent in the 
following manner: 
A. By making the house payment of approximately $320.00, 
directly to the mortgage company;3 and 
B. By payment $120.00 directly to the appellant.4 
Respondent was to make the house payment as indicated until such 
time as the house was sold.5 The separation agreement also stated 
that the family residence was to remain as the joint property of 
the parties until such time in the future that they may choose to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the property.6 A deceased spouse's 
interest, if applicable, was to be passed to the children.7 
The appellant and the parties two children resided in the 
home subsequent to the divorce. The respondent made the support 
payments by paying the mortgage payment on the home and by paying 
$120.00 per month directly to the appellant during their occupancy 
in the home, as was ordered in the decree of divorce.8 
There are critical conflicts in the testimony surrounding 
circumstances arising from activities occurring in April of 1979. 
It was in April of 1979 that appellant decided to move out of the 
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State of Colorado and suggested to respondent selling the home.9 
The respondent testified that he was reluctant to sell because he 
was enjoying a financial benefit through his ownership in the form 
of real estate tax deductions, mortgage interest deductions, equity 
increase and inflationary increase.10 Respondent also testified 
that he did agree to sell the home only after the appellant told 
him he would not have to pay the $320.00 house payment anymore.11 
The appellant denied ever telling respondent he did not 
have to pay the $320.00 if he allowed her to sell the home.12 
The home was listed for sale with a realtor,13 and in June, 
1979,14 the home was sold for the listed price.15 Each party 
received one-half share of the equity16 when the closing took place 
in August, 1979.17 The appellant immediately moved to the State of 
Utah to attend college.18 The respondent ceased making the full 
child support payment subsequent to the sale of the home, paying 
only $120.00 per month to the appellant.19 
In November, 198 0, the respondent appeared at the 
appellant's home in Utah, and after hearing that the appellant 
would not be returning to Colorado after her graduation, initiated 
and drafted a document entitled "Revised Child Support 
Agreement11.20 A typed version was signed by both parties.21 The 
terms of the agreement were that the respondent continue paying 
$120.00 per month in child support, with an adjustment for 
inflation (suggested by appellant), of $10.00 per month, per year, 
beginning in January, 1981. The respondent subsequently followed 
said child support schedule.22 
In November, 1983, the appellant obtained the services of 
an attorney who sent the respondent a letter23 requesting the 
difference in back child support, which had not been paid since the 
sale of the home, and based upon the original $440.00 per month the 
respondent was ordered to pay in the decree of divorce.24 The 
respondent failed to respond to this correspondence.25 
In May, 1984, the respondent moved from Colorado to Utah. 
Shortly thereafter, differences between appellant and respondent 
erupted over visitation and back child support. Both parties filed 
orders to show cause and/or petitions for modifications of the 
decree of divorce. The appellant asked for a judgment for back 
child support and other smaller judgments. The respondent 
requested increased visitation. A hearing was held by the court on 
the 5th and 6th days of March, 1985, for the purpose of disposing 
of all issues. 
The respondent plead estoppel and waiver defenses to the 
issues of back child support.26 It was his claim that the 
appellant coaxed him out of his future financial benefits of 
ownership in the home27 which he assumed were $408.00 per month, 
based upon a 10% inflation rate and a number of other 
assumptions.28 In exchange for his permission to sell the home, he 
claimed the appellant promised him orally that he would only have 
to pay her $120.00 per month, and not the $320.00 portion of the 
child support award in the decree of divorce.29 
It was the appellant's testimony that the respondent told 
her he would not pay her the $320.00 if she left the state. This 
is because he had quit his job, and he did not want to make it easy 
for her to take his children out of the State of Colorado. 
The evidence shows that the respondent owes the appellant 
back child support in the amount of $19,820.00.30 This represents 
66 months at the rate of $320.00 per month, minus small additional 
amounts paid. The amount of the arrearage was undisputed. 
A hearing was held before the court on March 5 and 6, 1985. 
All issues arising in both appellant's and respondent's orders to 
show cause/petition for modification were disposed of at that time. 
The appellant was denied a judgment for arrearages in child 
support. The respondent was granted specific rights of visitation. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Estoppel Issue Number I 
If estopple really exists as a defense to the 
non-payment of child support, an agreement of the 
parties cannot be the affirmative act of the obligee 
upon which the obligor claims reliance. 
Estopple Issue Number 2 
A. The evidence suggests, at best, that the 
appellant acquiesced in the face of respondents 
requests for a reduction of the child support 
obligation. Mere acquiesence is not the affirmative 
act by the obligee necessary to give the obligor an 
estopple defense for non-payment of child support. 
B. If the respondent relied on the acquiesence 
of the appellant, it was not reasonable to do so. He 
had simply assumed that his wife would remain in the 
home of the parties. He assumed the tax deduction for 
interest paid on the home was his, and assumed that he 
could prevent his former wife from leaving the state 
by not agreeing to sell the house. The respondent 
assumed he could bargain his cooperation with the 
appellant to sell the home for a reduction in child 
support. 
C. The respondent did not reasonably rely to 
his detriment and did not change position. The 
respondent tried to improve his position when he found 
his wife needed his cooperation to sell the home. He 
never had a right to the tax deduction available on 
the home. He traded that deduction for his equity in 
the home when he agreed to sell it. He cannot have 
his equity in the house and the tax deduction or its 
equivalent (a reduction in child support) at the same 
time. 
3. Non Court Approved Agreement to Prospectively Reduce 
Child Support 
A. The revised child support agreement of 
November, 1980, is simply a written agreement between 
parties to prospectively reduce child support. Utah 
law absolutely precludes reduction in child support by 
agreement of the parties, unless contemporaneously 
approved by the court. 
B. Nothing in the language of the stipulation 
for settlement supporting the Colorado decree of 
divorce provides for modification of the decree of 
divorce without court approval. 
C. Utah law requiring court approval of 
agreements to reduce child support cannot be abrogated 
by language in a Colorado stipulation or decree. 
D. The respondent chose Utah and its laws when 
he brought his action in Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
Judge Daniels of the District Court below made some 
findings which the appellant believes are not supported by the 
testimony. The appellant also believes that the court below made 
mistakes in applying the law to the facts, reaching some erroneous 
conclusions of law. 
The appellant contends that the District Court should have 
granted her judgment for back child support and that the respondent 
did not have estoppel or waiver defenses available to him under the 
facts. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law the court made 
are contained in the appendices, but are restated here because of 
their importance to the argument. 
With regard to the back child support issue, the court made 
the following finding of fact: 
111. The court finds that it was the intention of the 
Judge in Colorado to provide for a child support payment 
in the amount of $440.00 per month. The court makes this 
finding based on the fact that the separation agreement 
in the matter is unclear and, therefore, a separate 
paragraph was added to the decree of divorce to make the 
$440.00 per month payment clear. The court further finds 
that said payment of $440.00 per month as child support 
was the courts order at the time of the decree, without 
regard to whether the house was sold, or not. 
"2. The court further finds that based on the evidence, 
the defendant waived her right to collect arrearages in 
child support for the period between the decree of 
divorce and the revised child support agreement entered 
into in November of 1980. The court further finds that 
the plaintiff reasonably relied on the revised child 
support agreement, and that the defendant should be 
estopped from collecting arrearages in child support 
arising between the date of the child support agreement 
in November, 1980, up to and including the month of 
February, 1985. The court finds the intention of the 
parties was, at the time of the revised child support 
agreement, that 
the defendant would only collect from the plaintiff, from 
that time forward, the sum of $120.00 per month. The 
court further finds that the plaintiff relied on that. 
"3. The court further finds that the defendant does not 
have the power to waive future payments from this time 
forward, in that they are not hers to waive, but rather 
that they belong to the children. The court further 
finds that the plaintiff should be ordered to pay child 
support to the defendant at the rate of $440.00 per month 
from March, 1985, until further order of the court, or 
terminated as a matter of law." 
The court concluded as a matter of law that: 
"1. The defendant should be estopped from collecting 
unpaid child support based on arrearages which accrued 
anytime during the past from the date of the decree of 
divorce up until the last day of March, 1985. The court 
further concludes, however, as a matter of law, that the 
full amount of $440.00 per month be paid to the defendant 
by the plaintiff as and for child support beginning March 
1st, 1985, and continuing thereafter until further court 
order, or as the obligation may otherwise be terminated 
as a matter of law." 
It should be noted that the language of the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law quoted above, was disputed by the 
litigants subsequent to trial. Findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were proposed by both parties, and the above quoted findings 
and conclusion language was the result of a hearing on objections 
filed by both parties. The language contained in the findings and 
conclusions was specifically outlined by the court in resolution of 
the parties objections to proposed orders. 
Appellant finds the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
internally inconsistent. There are three internal inconsistencies, 
they are: 
1* If, as the court states in finding number 3, that the 
appellant did not have the power to waive future payments of child 
support, and that they were not hers to waive, but rather that they 
belonged to the children, then she never had that power; 
2. If the respondent ever reasonably relied to his 
detriment on the revised child support agreement of November, 1980, 
or the earlier agreement of April, 1979, and can be allowed an 
estoppel defense, then the estoppel should have continued in force 
beyond the March 5-6 hearing. There was no evidence to the effect 
that respondent was no longer relying on an agreement for reduction 
in child support; and 
3. A reading of these three findings and conclusions 
makes it appear as though there is some requirement of evidence 
that demands have been made by the appellant for payment, when 
there clearly is not. 
Appellant contends that Judge Daniels simply did not 
successfully find a way to reconcile in his mind the estoppel 
doctrine and the rule of law which requires agreements for 
reduction in future child support to be court approved. Judge 
Daniels erroneously decided that the defense of estoppel was 
available to the respondent, and then cut off said estoppel, 
effective on the trial date. He did this without a showing as to 
which facts had changed, no longer creating reasonable reliance. 
It is as if notice of demand is the issue, when neither party 
claimed it to be. The findings make no mention of the letter of 
demand which the appellant testified to, sent November 9th, 1983, 
which respondent admitted receiving. 
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ISSUE I 
IS THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE TO THE 
PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT? 
A reading of the Supreme Court decisions of this state as 
to the interaction of the doctrine of estoppel and the requirement 
that agreements to prospectively reduce child support be previously 
approved by the court, leave one without a satisfactory thread of 
commonality running between them. 
Utah Supreme Court cases on point make three seemingly 
incongruent statements concerning these two doctrines. Those 
statements are: 
1. There is no estoppel defense available to child 
support obligors; 
2. Equitable estoppel is a defense available to child 
support obligors if they can demonstrate all of the elements of the 
estoppel, including affirmative acts on the part of the obligee; 
reasonable reliance on the part of the obligor; and detriment to 
the obligor and/or a change of position, based on said reliance; 
and 
3. Regardless of estoppel doctrine, no parties can make 
an enforceable agreement to prospectively reduce a child support 
obligation, orally or in writing, without previous court approval. 
This court decided in 1981 the case of Hills v. Hills. In 
Hills the parties had entered into a stipulation prior to the 
divorce. Somehow a decree was entered which terminated Mr. Hill's 
parental rights, and establishing no child support obligation. 
Later, the mother and the State Department of Social Services 
petitioned for a modification to the decree of divorce, to 
establish a child support obligation. The District Court granted 
the petition, and the father appealed. Justice Oakes, writing for 
the court, stated that: 
"There is no merit to the contention that the parents' 
stipulation effectively terminated the father's parental 
obligations. The right to support from the parent 
belongs to the minor children and is not subject to being 
bartared awav, extinguished, estopped or in any way 
defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parents. 
Gullev v. Gullev, Utah, 570 P.2d 127 (1977); Bags v. 
Anderson, Utah, 528 P.2d 141 (1974); French v. Johnson, 
Utah, 401 P.2d 315 (1965). We cannot see how the 
incorporation of such a stipulation a decree of the 
district court or the juvenille court gives it any 
greater affect. If parental rights and obligations are 
to be terminated, this must be done by decree in a manner 
prescribed by law." [Emphasis added.] 
Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981) 
The facts of the Hills case are unlike those in the instant 
case. However, the court seems to be stating that the child 
support obligation is simply not subject to a defense based on 
estoppel. 
In the case of Baggs v. Anderson decided in 1974, the court 
dealt with a fact situation very similar to the facts in the 
instant case. In Baggs the plaintiff and defendant were divorced 
with a divorce decree which provided for child support in a 
specific amount. Subsequent to a series of telephone calls and 
conversations between the parties, they executed a written 
agreement to the effect that the father would be relieved from the 
payment of any futher child support money. Further facts were that 
the custodial parent, the mother, had planned to marry again, and 
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that both parties, and the mother1 s fiance all agreed that the 
father would not visit with the children, that the mother would no 
longer receive child support from the father, and that the new 
husband could support the children. There was some discussion of 
Mrs. Baggs1 new husband adopting the children, but that did not 
occur. Subsequently the wife brought an action for arrearages in 
child support. The father claimed the estoppel defense. The lower 
court denied the defense of estoppel, entering judgment on behalf 
of the mother for the fact child support. The father appealed. 
This court explained that child support falls into two 
separate categories; first, the current and ongoing right to 
receive future support; and, second, the right to receive 
reimbursement for support already provided by another. 
The court stated: 
"His claim is based primarily on the agreement signed by 
the parties on November 1st, 1971 and statements of the 
plaintiff and Mr. Bags, which defendant avers had the 
effect of excusing him from paying future payments of 
child support. This court has heretofore had occasion to 
deal with that problem, and it is held that the right to 
receive current and future money belongs to the minor 
children, and that it is not subject to being bartered 
away or estopped, or in any way defeated by the conduct 
of the parents, or others..." [Emphasis added.] 
The court further stated that: 
"Neither is there any satisfactory showing that the 
defendant made any substantial change in his position 
because of reliance on the facts he claims constituted 
the estoppel. This requirement is not satisfied by the 
mere fact that he indulged in a pleasant and euphoric 
assumption that he would not have to meet his obligations 
in that he bought a more expensive car and moved to a 
more expensive apartment. Likewise, the mere passage of 
time or the failure of a creditor to bedevil the debtor 
for payment, does not create an estoppel." 
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) 
This case is confusing because, on the one hand, it states 
estoppel is not available as a defense, but then states that the 
obligor did not meet the requisite elements of the estoppel as 
though it could potentially be a defense. 
On the other hand, other Supreme Court decisions have 
stated that if one can qualify for it, the estoppel defense is 
available. Interestingly, none of the cases which have announced 
the estoppel doctrine as being alive and well have affirmed a 
decision of a lower court granting an estoppel defense. In every 
instance where a Supreme Court decision recites the equitable 
estoppel doctrine as a defense to the payment of child support, the 
elements of equitable estoppel are outlined, but the defense is 
denied the claimant of the defense. This was the outcome in Baggs 
v. Anderson cited immediately above, in which this court affirmed 
the District Court who had ruled that the mother was not estopped. 
In Ross v. Ross, decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1979, 
an ex husband brought suit in Utah to modify a California decree of 
divorce, and the ex wife counterclaimed for arrearages in child 
support and alimony. The District Court awarded the ex wife a 
judgment for $24,457.00 in arrearages in child support and alimony 
and the ex husband appealed, claiming that he was entitled to the 
estoppel defense which had been improperly denied him. 
In apparent approval of the concept that estoppel is 
available as a defense to a child support obligor, the court 
recited the elements of the estoppel theory and stated: 
"In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel, plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant, by her representations or 
actions, led the plaintiff to believe that he need not 
pay alimony or child support, and that the plaintiff, in 
reliance on said representations, changed his position to 
his detriment. In such a case, enforcement of the decree 
creates a hardship and injustice to the plaintiff, and 
the defendant would be estopped to deny her own 
misrepresentations, and estopped from claiming unpaid 
support.,f 
Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979) 
The court went on, however, to explain that the evidence 
presented the court below was not sufficient to establish the 
elements of the estoppel doctrine, and affirmed the decision of the 
District Court. This, again, announces the doctrine of estoppel, 
but denies its application to the party claiming it. 
Perhaps the respondents best Supreme Court decision with 
regard to estoppel as a defense, is the case of Larsen v. Larsen, 
decided by this court in 1956. This case comes as close to our 
Supreme Court affirming a defense of estoppel as can be found. The 
facts of Larsen are fundamentally different than those in the 
instant case, in that the estoppel claimed by the child support 
obligor was not based on a claimed agreement between former spouses 
to reduce child support. The wife brought an order to show cause 
in the District Court for a judgment for back child support. The 
husband alleged that his failure to make payments was because the 
wife had refused to accept child support payments from him, and 
told him that a third party, whom she had married, was supporting 
the child and that he was to refrain from trying to see her or the 
child. The obligor had reasonably relied on he representations, 
and because of those representations and his reliance thereon, he 
had changed his position in that he had remarried, and had taken on 
other obligations, which he would not have undertaken had he known 
that all of the child support monies would later be demanded and 
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payable under the decree. The father further alleged that the 
mother had informed him that she and her new husband would support 
the child if he would stay away and not interfere in their lives. 
The court, in Larsen, citing Price v. Price, 4 Ut 2d 153, 
289 P.2d 1044, stated that: 
"In Price v. Price we held that because the state is 
interested in the child's welfare, the parents cannot 
effectively release future payments of support money by 
agreeing with the other to that effect. However, this 
does not mean that a mother may not, by her actions or 
representations, or both, preclude herself from 
recovering past due installments of support money to 
reimburse her for the money which she has spent for the 
support of the child. Where the father has failed to 
make such payments was induced by her representations or 
actions, and where, as a result of such representations 
or actions, the father has been lulled into failing to 
make such payments and into changing his position, which 
he would not have done, but for such representations, and 
that as a result of such failure to pay and change in his 
conditions, it would cause him great hardship and 
injustice if she is allowed to enforce the payment of 
such back installments. She may be thereby estopped from 
enforcing the payment of such back installments.11 
Larsen v. Larsen, 300 P.2d 596, 598 (Utah 1956) 
The court decided in Larsen that the District Court had 
made insufficient findings to determine whether or not an estoppel 
defense was available to the obligor, and remanded the matter back 
to the District Court. 
Hence, we have a situation where the doctrine of estoppel 
has been announced as being alive and well in some Supreme Court 
decisions, and denounced as not being available in others. 
Appellant urges the court to adopt the position that some 
types of affirmative conduct on the part of a child support obligee 
could, under limited circumstances, give rise to an estoppel 
defense. However, the appellant urges the court to conclude that 
the conduct on which the obligor claims to reasonably rely cannot 
be an agreement to prospectively reduce the child support either 
orally or in writing. 
Additional cases supporting the proposition that the 
parties cannot make an enforceable agreement to forgive prospective 
child support are contained in the argument section of this brief, 
dealing with issue number III. 
ISSUE II 
DOES THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT TRIAL 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE COURT BELOW THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD 
REASONABLY RELIED ON AN ORAL AGREEMENT MADE, TO HIS DETRIMENT, TO 
REDUCE CHILD SUPPORT, ENTITLING HIM TO AN ESTOPPEL DEFENSE? 
RULE OF LAW 
IN ORDER FOR A PARTY TO A DIVORCE OWING CHILD SUPPORT TO 
SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND ON THE BASIS OF ESTOPPEL, SAID PERSON MUST 
DEMONSTRATE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE ESTOPPEL. THIS INCLUDES 
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTS THE OTHER PARTY DID ON WHICH THEY RELIED. THAT 
THEIR RELIANCE WAS REASONABLE. AND AN ACTUAL DETRIMENT SHOWN. MERE 
SILENCE OR ACOUIESENCE ON THE PART OF A CHILD SUPPORT CREDITOR IS 
NOT SUFFICIENT. 
In the instant case, the appellant testified that she had 
no conversations at any time with the respondent in which she 
agreed to take less than the $440.00 per month child support 
awarded by the Colorado court. The testimony of the appellant was 
unequivocal, unambiguous and without condition or exception. 
Appellant testified that the respondent requested agreements for 
reduction of child support both in connection with, and separate 
from, the sale of the house. She further testified that she 
steadfastly refused those requests. 
The respondent, on the other hand, testified that he 
understood that a portion of his child support obligation, which 
was being paid to the appellant in the form of a continuing payment 
on the home, would, upon the sale of the home in August, 1979, be 
excused. In contradiction, however, the respondent further 
testified that he had never considered what would happen if the 
appellant moved from the home. 
The respondent testified that up until the time of the 
alleged agreement (April, 1979) he had enjoyed for one year, and 
expected to continue to enjoy the tax advantages available in 
claiming a deduction for property tax and interest paid on the 
home. Neither the property settlement agreement, nor the decree, 
award these deductions to the respondent. Neither party testified 
concerning any oral or written agreement entered into between them 
subsequent to the divorce, that the respondent would be entitled to 
the tax deductions. 
The respondent testified that he would not have agreed to 
sell the house but for the appellants oral agreement to reduce 
child support. No court order existed at the time, nor has an 
order ever existed, which required the appellant to get the consent 
of the respondent to sell the house. Neither party testified that 
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the respondent's consent was required to sell the house. 
In the decree of divorce, the appellant was awarded the 
occupancy of the home and the respondent a lien equal to 50% of the 
equity in the Colorado decree of divorce. When the appellant 
wanted to sell, the respondent agreed to the sale, the sales price, 
and was paid one-half of the equity when the sale was consummated. 
The respondent testified he would not have agreed to sell the home 
and allow the appellant to leave the state, but for her oral 
agreement to reduce child support. The respondent further 
testified that he lost the amount of $408.00 per month in tax 
advantages when the house wa sold. Respondent further stated that 
he relied on the oral promise to reduce child support to compensate 
him for the lost tax advantage. 
THERE WERE NO AFFIRMATIVE ACTS ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT UPON 
WHICH RESPONDENT RELIED 
The appellant and respondent gave diametrically opposite 
testimony as to whether or not there was an oral agreement by the 
appellant to forgive or waive the $320.00 portion of the child 
support. No corroborating witnesses testified for either party. A 
reasonable interpretation of the testimony would be that the 
appellant simply avoided the respondents requests for an agreement 
on the issue. 
The appellant had nothing to gain by agreeing to reduce 
child support. She did not need the consent of the respondent to 
sell the home or to otherwise liquidate her interest in it. She 
did not need the consent of the respondent to sell the house, move 
to Utah, or to take the children with her. 
If taken in a light most favorable to the respondent, the 
testimony suggests acquiesence on the part of the appellant. It is 
reasonable to believe that in the face of repeated requests by the 
respondent, the appellant, needing the respondents cooperation to 
sell the house without going back to court, simply did nothing to 
upset him. Hence, the appellantfs testimony that there were no 
"conversations" in which she "agreed". 
In the case of Adams v. Adams, Utah 1979, this court ruled, 
with regard to an arrearage for child support owed by Mr. Adams, 
that the estoppel defense was not available to him based on his 
reliance on the fact that his former wife had not openly and 
notoriously opposed and resisted his plan to reduce child support, 
and stated: 
"...mere silence on the part of the plaintiff (Mrs. 
Adams) is not sufficient to raise estoppel, and we find 
nothing in the record to support the court's finding that 
she had a duty to speak..." 
Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 146 (Utah 1979) 
It is clear from the transcript that the respondent did not 
want the appellant to leave Colorado, or to take the children with 
her. The respondent agreed both to the sale of the home and the 
sales price, but only reluctantly. Nothing in the Colorado decree, 
or law, gave respondent the power to block the appellant's selling 
the house or leaving the state, but the respondent seemed to think 
he had that power. The appellant did not agree to a reduction. On 
the other hand, she was anxious to leave Colorado and go to school 
in Provo, Utah. If the appellant acquiesced it was in the face of 
coercion in the form of her former husband's being otherwise 
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unwilling to cooperate with her in the selling of the home. 
In any event, agreement or not, acquiesence or not, the 
alleged agreement of April, 1979 amounts to nothing more than an 
unenforceable agreement of the parties to prospectively reduce 
child support. This issue is treated below. 
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT REASONABLY RELY ON THE ACQUIESENCE OF THE 
APPELLANT 
The respondent testified that he relied on the oral 
agreement of the appellant to free him of the house payment portion 
of the total child support obligation ($320.00 of the $440.00) in 
return for agreeing to sell the house and letting leave the state. 
He also testified in support of plaintiffs exhibit #5, which 
purports to be a list of tax advantages lost to him because of the 
sale of the home. 
Certainly, respondent could have delayed the appellant in 
leaving Colorado by not cooperating in the sale of the home. 
Ultimately, however, even if court action had been necessary, it 
seems obvious that appellant would have been allowed to liquidate 
her interest and leave the state. There is no hint of evidence to 
the contrary. The question of the appellant taking the children 
with her was not an issue. 
Respondent was also aware of the time pressure involved, in 
that the appellant wanted to move to Provo to begin classes in the 
fall of 1979, and that his cooperation was needed. The respondent 
used the appellant fs desire to sell the house quickly as an 
opportunity to barter her cooperation for a reduction in child 
support. Certainly the courts will not allow an estopple argument 
to arise out of the appellants acguiesence in the face of time 
pressure due to the respondents unwillingness to cooperate. 
Regardless of what testimony is believed, the respondents 
reliance was not reasonable. He thought he could trade his power 
to delay the plans of the appellant to sell and leave, for a 
$320.00 per month reduction in child support. The respondent 
admitted in testimony that there was insufficient time for the 
appellant to go to court over the matter and that she wanted his 
cooperation without having to go to court. 
Respondents reliance was unreasonable. He relied on being 
able to obtain a reduction in child support in return for letting 
his former wife leave the state and go to school, which required 
the selling of the home. His former wife had a right to do those 
things without his agreement, or giving up child support to do it. 
The respondent in this matter, Mr. Blackburn, similarly 
relied on the mistaken notions he had concerning his right to block 
the sale of the house and keep his former wife and children in the 
State of Colorado. The respondent erroneously assumed that his 
former wife would stay in Colorado in the home in which they had 
previously lived, and that he would have the tax advantage of 
ownership, although it had never been awarded him. The appellant 
clearly has the right to liquidate the home, sell her interest and 
leave the state if she wished. The respondent's reliance is on his 
mistaken assumptions, not upon the words and actions of the 
appellant. 
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT RELY TO HIS DETRIMENT. HE EXPERIENCED NO 
O Q 
CHANGE OF POSITION. 
The claim of the defendant that he changed his position to 
his detriment because he gave up tax deductions when he agreed to 
sell the home will not withstand careful examination. 
First, neither the decree of divorce, nor any other court 
order, had awarded the tax deductions to the respondent. There was 
no testimony or other evidence that the parties had agreed to allow 
the respondent to use the tax deductions. It was unreasonable for 
the respondent to rely on having said deductions at all. 
At the trial, respondent testified in support of his 
exhibit number 5. It was admitted into evidence as being 
illustrative of his testimony only. The house was a $68,000.00 
house. The payment on it was $320.00 per month. It is simply not 
credible to believe that tax deductions available to the respondent 
for making the house payment on said house saved the respondent 
$408.00 per month or $4,896.00 per year in taxes paid. Respondent 
admitted that his calculations on exhibit number 5 assumed a 10% 
per annum increase in value of the home due to inflation. 
The respondent testified that his calculations as to the 
value of the tax deduction was also based on an assumption that he 
would have income of $20,000.00 per year. Under cross examination 
respondent testified that in three of the four years following the 
alleged agreement, he had substantially less income. 
The defendants calculations as to the value of the 
deductions for home ownership were without foundation and 
overstated. 
The important points to remember, in the appellants view, 
are that the deduction was not the respondents to begin with. 
Appellant had the right to liquidate her interest in the house at 
anytime, and to move from it. The respondent agreed to sell the 
house, and agreed to the sale price. He was paid one-half of the 
equity at the time of sale. 
The respondent received the benefit of the sale and his 
equity, in the form of cash, in his hand. He could not have had 
both the equity and the advantages of ownership of the property at 
the same time. By choosing the equity, he gave up the tax 
deductions. Now he asks the court to give him both his equity of 
$13,000.00+, and the tax deduction in the form of reduced child 
support. The appellant received her equity for the sale of the 
home and nothing more. This was a home in which she could have 
lived, payment free, as long as the children of the parties were 
unemancipated. The defendants obligations to make the house 
payment as part of child support was clear. The respondent, on the 
other hand, received (based on the lower courts ruling) his one-
half of the equity in the amount of $13,000.00+, and the continuing 
benefit of ownership in the form of a reduction in child support. 
Respondent did not change his position to his detriment. 
He tried to improve his position and capitalize on his former 
wife's need for his cooperation to sell the house. Respondent 
received his equity from the sale of the home. He asks the court 
to allow him to retain the tax advantage he had assumed, by 
replacing it with a reduction in his child support obligation to 
the appellant. Where did the cash equity go? Not to child 
support. Enforcement of the Colorado decree for child support is 
not now unjust or unfair. It simply prevents the respondent from 
enjoying an improvement in his position at the expense of the 
children. 
There was no change of position by the respondent to his 
detriment. He did not remarry. He did not take on any new debts. 
He simply traded the tax advantages of ownership as a part owner of 
the home for $13,000.00+ of the cash in hand. He tried to convince 
the appellant he should get a reduction in child support for making 
the trade. 
Again, in the 1974 Utah Supreme Court case of Baggs v. 
Anderson cited above, the former wife (Baggs) brought an action 
against her former husband (Anderson) to enforce collection of 
child support payments. The defendant father, Anderson, raised the 
defense of estoppel. In denying the defendant the estoppel 
argument as a defense, the court stated that: 
"We accept the defendants contention that there may be 
some circumstances under which there may arise an 
estoppel to collect money accrued under a divorce decree, 
the same as there may be an estoppel to enforce any other 
obligation including the payment of money. But the rules 
of estoppel applicable elsewhere in the law are similarly 
applicable here. An essential recruirement is there must 
be some conduct of the obligee which reasonably induces 
the obligor to rely thereon and made some substantial 
change in his position to his detriment. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The facts of the instant case, with regard to an agreement 
at the time of the sale of the home to reduce child support are, 
regardless of which testimony is believed, that the respondent 
assumed that he would have the tax advantages of owning a home as a 
condition to his paying the full child support amount. When he 
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lost the deduction for property taxes and interest on the home, he 
quit paying the full amount, and paid the court ordered amount 
minus the house payment. His reliance was not on any conversation 
he had with the appellant, but on his interpretation of the meaning 
and effect of the decree. The decree's order of $440.00 per month 
child support is unambiguous, and the lower court so found in 
paragraph number 1 of its findings of fact. The respondent did not 
rely on the actions of the appellant, but on his own uncounseled 
understanding of what the property settlement agreement and decree 
meant. When the home was sold, he tried to get the appellant to 
agree with his assumptions. The parties talked. He believes that 
they agreed. She believes that they did not. 
Did the respondent change his position in reliance on the 
home being continuously available for tax and interest deduction 
purposes? No. He simply lost something he had assumed he would 
have. He did not change his position in any way. 
ISSUE III 
DID THE COURT BELOW COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE REVISED CHILD SUPPORT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER, 1980, EXCUSED 
THE RESPONDENT FROM HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION, AND THAT THE 
APPELLANT COULD WAIVE A PROSPECTIVE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL? 
RULE OF LAW 
NEITHER PARTY IN A DIVORCE ACTION CAN ORALLY, OR IN 
WRITING, RELEASE, WAIVE OR OTHERWISE BARGAIN AWAY, ANY PORTION OF 
THE COURT ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT WITHOUT PRIOR JUDICIAL 
APPROVAL. 
With regard to the courts finding that the appellant waived 
the $320.00 portion of the child support by entering into the 
revised child support agreement of November, 1980, or by entering 
into the alleged oral agreement of April, 1979, the lower court 
committed legal error. 
There is only one dispute between the parties concerning 
the facts surrounding the revised child support agreement made in 
November of 1980. Both parties testified that the respondent came 
to Provo, Utah in November, 1980, approximately a year and a half 
after the house had been sold, the equity divided between the 
parties, and the appellant moving to Provo to live. Both parties 
testified that the respondent came to Provo and actually stayed in 
the same home with the appellant, her mother, and the parties 
children. Both parties further testified that the written revised 
child support agreement of 1980 was the idea of the respondent and 
that he suggested the terms contained therein. 
The dispute in the testimony is that the appellant 
testified that she believed that, in signing the agreement, she was 
establishing that the respondent had to pay her $120.00 per month, 
and that she feared that he would unilaterally reduce it further if 
she did not sign. Appellant further testified that living in her 
mother's home and having some financial support from her, she did 
not push the issue concerning $320.00 per month arrearage which had 
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been building since she left Colorado. On the other hand, the 
respondent testified that he feared the appellant did not 
understand, or would not later admit, that she had agreed to a 
reduction in child support and that his purpose in having the 
appellant sign the revised child support agreement of November, 
1980, was to create written evidence of their agreement. 
There was no testimony given, or other evidence offered, at 
the time of trial in support of the idea that the respondent relied 
on the November, 1980 agreement to change his position in any new 
or different way, only that he sought said written agreement to 
back up his original reliance on the alleged oral agreement of 
April, 1979. There is no estoppel argument made by the respondent 
in connection with the revised child support agreement of 1980, 
because there is no new change of position or reliance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled time and time again that the 
parties cannot, by themselves, make an effective or enforceable 
agreement to waive future child support payments, and that any such 
agreement, whether oral or in writing, not previously approved by the 
court, is unenforceable. Neither the alleged oral agreement of April, 
1979, nor the written agreement of November, 1980, were ever presented 
to, or approved by, any court. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Price v. Price, decided in 
1955, the court said with regard to an agreement to eliminate future 
child support entered into between the parties, but without court's 
approval: 
"Future child support effectively cannot be the subject 
of a bargain and sale. Among other things, the state is 
an interested party in such matters since the child's 
welfare is at stake, and any modification of a child 
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support award must be approved by the court." 
Price v. Price, 289 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1955) 
Later, in 1959, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed its 
position with regard to the parties entering into agreements 
reducing or eliminating child support obligations without court 
approval. In Wallis v. Wallis the court said, in reversing the 
Third District Court's previous judgment, that a post divorce 
agreement between the parties concerning alimony and child support 
was void and ineffective, and stated: 
"The power of the parties to make agreements changing the 
monetary terms of a divorce decree is generally upheld, 
except where future child support is concerned." 
[Emphasis added.] 
Wallis v. Wallis, 342 P.2d 103 (Utah 1959) 
In 1965 the Utah Supreme Court ruled, in the case of French 
v. Johnson, on both the issue of estoppel and on the parties 
ability to enter into an agreement altering a child support order 
of the court, stating: 
"A decree awarding child support payments cannot be 
avoided by parents conduct or agreement. Support decrees 
are awarded and protected by the state for its interest 
in children of a severed marriage." 
French v. Johnson, 401 P.2d 315 (Utah 1965) 
In the instant case, there was a dispute in the testimony 
as to the intention of the parties at the time the revised child 
support agreement was signed. The appellant indicates that she had 
been receiving $120.00 per month. She further testified that she 
had come to expect that she would never see any additional money 
from her former husband, and saw it as an opportunity to escalate 
upwards the $120.00 amount because she feared never seeing any 
other amounts. She expressly denied that she ever agreed that she 
did not need, did not want, or that the plaintiff did not have to 
pay, the rest of the child support payment which he had quit paying 
when the house was sold. The respondent, on the other hand, 
testified that he believed that even though he had not been paying 
the $320.00 portion of the child support payment ever since the 
house had been sold in August, 1979, that in November, 1980, he 
decided that he needed to get that agreement in writing. 
It seems clear from the Utah cases directly on point that 
the dispute of facts as to the earlier oral, or later written, 
agreements are irrelevant. The parties did not have the power to 
enter into the agreements in question. The defendant could not 
have given away the child support of the children on either 
occasion prospectively if she had wanted to, orally or in writing, 
without court approval. The respondent could not obtain any relief 
by entering into an agreement with the appellant, orally or in 
writing, unless the court, who had the state's interests to 
protect, had reviewed and approved such an agreement. 
Even if the lower court had resolved the conflicts in 
testimony about agreements made in respondents favor, (which 
conclusion would be unreasonable in view of the testimony by 
respondent about his assumptions concerning the house), such 
agreements to relieve future child support obligations are 
ineffective, unenforceable and void as against public policy, 
unless approved by the court. 
Respondent argued in the court below that there was 
language in the stipulation, upon which the Colorado decree of 
divorce was based, which provided that the parties could modify the 
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decree by further written stipulation. That stipulation provided 
on page seven, general provisions: 
,fNo modification or waiver of any of the terms of this 
agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by 
both parties." [Emphasis added.] 
(Appendix C, Separation Agreement) 
This language, however, should not be misunderstood as 
containing the power to modify a decree of divorce, but rather, 
granting the parties the power to modify their stipulation by 
subsequent written amendment, prior to being reduced to judgment in 
the decree. Of necessity, public policy requires that the state 
protect its interest in making sure the children are supported. 
One of the vehicles by which the state protects its interest in the 
children is through the laws requiring that the courts approve such 
reductions and that the childrenfs interests remain protected. 
Even if the language of the stipulation were construed to give the 
power to modify the decree to the parties, certainly, a written 
agreement of the parties cannot abrogate common law designed to 
keep the parties from entering into such an agreement. 
The respondent came to the State of Utah and sought 
enforcement of a Colorado decree. At the time the respondent filed 
his petition for modification, he, the appellant and the parties 
minor children were all residing in the State of Utah. It was 
apparent from the evidence taken at the time of hearing that all 
parties intended to continue to reside in the State of Utah. By 
filing his action in the State of Utah under those facts, the 
respondent, in choosing the Utah forum, also chose the laws of the 
State of Utah. Clearly, the common law as established in the cases 
cited above, precluding the parties from entering into an agreement 
^7 
to reduce prospective child support, is not overcome by any 
language in the stipulation made prior to the decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is alive and well and 
available to child support debtors as a defense to the entry of 
judgments for arrearages in child support. Such a defense, 
however, is limited in its application, and the act on the part of 
the child support obligee, on which the obligor claims to have 
relied to their detriment, cannot be in the form of an agreement, 
oral or in writing, to prospectively reduce a child support 
obligation. 
In April of 1979, when the house was listed for sale and 
when the respondent claims an agreement was made, and in November 
of 1980, when the written revised child support agreement was made, 
the claim of the respondent is that an agreement, either oral (in 
the first instance) or in writing (the second instance) was then 
made to reduce then future child support. In neither instance was 
the state's vital interest in protecting the children protected by 
adherence to the common law requirement that said agreements to 
reduce prospective child support be approved by the court. Neither 
of the two agreements upon which the respondent claims to have 
relied were to forgive arrearages, but rather were as to 
prospective child support. 
The evidence as to whether or not an oral agreement was 
entered into between the parties to reduce future child support, in 
April of 1979 when the house was put up for sale, must be carefully 
looked at. The appellant testified that she never made an 
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agreement. The respondent claims he outlined all of his thinking 
and reasoning for the appellant concerning not wanting her to leave 
Colorado, not wanting her to sell the home and the loss of tax 
deductions. The appellant needed and requested the cooperation of 
the respondent. The respondent knew the appellant did not want to 
have to go to court to be able to sell the home, and that she 
needed to be in Provo, Utah by August, 1979. The respondent claims 
he had the appellant's approval and that there was an agreement 
that he could reduce child support. The appellant testified that 
she had no conversations in which she agreed. It is apparent that 
she simply acquiesced, the respondent did not pay, and she 
continued to acquiesce. Acquiesence is not the affirmative act 
upon which the respondent relied, but rather on his own incorrect 
assumptions concerning his ability to block her leaving, block her 
sale of the home and the availability to him of the tax deduction 
for ownership of the home. 
The respondent did not reasonably rely to his detriment on 
anything the appellant did, but rather he simply saw an opportunity 
to get his share of the equity out of the house and to keep the tax 
deduction as though it had not been sold, by requesting of his 
former spouse, who was anxious to leave, that he not be required to 
pay child support. He assumed, when she did not demand the payment 
of child support by taking him to court to enforce it, that she 
agreed and would never later request it. 
The Utah Supreme Court cases on point clearly state that 
the alleged agreement of the parties in April, 1979, and the 
written agreement to reduce child support of November, 1980, are 
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not enforceable, because they purport to reduce prospective child 
support. Neither of these agreements were approved by any court. 
The rights of the children were never protected. 
No language in the stipulation and property settlement 
agreement entered into in support of the Colorado decree abrogated 
the Utah law requirement that agreements to reduce prospective 
child support must be approved by the court. The respondent chose 
Utah and its laws when he filed his petition for modification 
action in Utah, with all parties and the minor children then 
residing in Utah. 
The judgment of the Honorable Scott Daniels of the Third 
District Court, denying appellant judgment for arrearages then 
owing for child support in the amount of $19,840.00, should be 
reversed. This court should award the appellant judgment in the 
amount of $19,840.00 for arrearages in child support arising 
between August, 1979 and March 1st, 1985, plus interest on said 
amount from March 1, 1985 through the date of judgment at the rate 
of 10% per annum. 
The appellant should further be awarded all of her costs of 
court and attorneys fees incurred in the original District Court 
action to collect child support and incurred in bringing and 
maintaining this appeal. The issue of amount of costs and 
attorneys fees to be awarded in the District Court action below, 
and this appeal, should be remanded to the District Court for 
appropriate hearing. 
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DATED this 24th day of November, 1987. 
< ^ X ^ A AIYZZL 
David A. McPhie 
42 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I had hand delivered four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing appellant's brief, to attorney for 
respondent, David J. Berceau, at 261 East 300 South, Suite 150, 
Salt Lake City, Utah on this 25th day of November, 1987. 
David A. McPhie 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
147 North Second West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: 3 63-3 311 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT FERRIS BLACKBURN, JR.
 # ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OP PACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C84-4490 
CAROL J. BLACKBURN MOYES, ) 
) Judge Scott Daniels 
Defendant. ) 
THI~ MATTER came on for trial at the regularly schedule 
time, that being the 5th day of March, 19B5 before the Honorable 
Judge Scott Daniels. The plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, David J. Berceau. The defendant 
appeared personally, and was represented by her counsel of 
record, David A. McPhie. The court having heared the testimony 
presented by both parties and items of documentary evidence, and 
having considred the file, and good cause appearing therefor, now 
publishes the following as its: 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1* The court finds that it was the intention of the judge 
in Colorado to provide for a child support payment in the amount 
of 3440.00 per month. the court mak?s this finding b?.?--?"' on t:v? 
f.?.ct th^t th^ srrp*=ir51 ion ^pr^emr.nt in t.h^  rts^ 'r^ r ir u^ '-i °"?" - '*'*-* 
25thf and that the plaintiff should have them every other 
D^ce^ber 24th, Likewise, the plaintiff should have the chil-'r-n 
alternating December 25th, and the defendant December ?*th *yzzy 
other year* For calendar year 1985, the court finds that it is 
reasonable and equitable that the plaintiff have the children on 
December 24th, and that the defendant should have them on 
Christmas Day. The court further finds that should the parties 
want to negotiate something different from this finding, to take 
into consideration traveling plans, that is' fine, but in the 
absence of such an agre^msnt by both parties, the above finding 
should be controlling for Christmas visitation. 
13. The court finds that with regard to the childrens 
birthdays, that the defendant should have the children on their 
birthdays in 1995 and in alternating years thereafter. The court 
further finds that on alternating years the plaintiff should have 
the children on their birthdays after school. The court further 
finds that on those years when the plaintiff has no visitation on 
the childrens birthdays, that he should enjoy visitation on the 
evening of the next day after school. 
14. The court further finds that the plaintiff should be 
awarded on month continuous visitation to occur each summer, and 
that it is reasonable and equitable that he be required to give 
the defendant 48 hours prior notice if he does not intend to 
exercise visitation. The court further finds that it is reason-
able and equitable that the plaintiff give to the defendant 
notice ^s of rtoril 15th cf ^ich y*ar r^  to which 1 month bloc*; of 
time in the summer he intends to exercise his visitation. 
tion on alternating works from those which he has weekend 
visitation, on Thursday from 4:00 until 3:00 p.m. 
9. The court further finds that the plaintiff should have 
as visitation every other holiday from the following list: 
a* New Yesrs Day; 
b. Presidents Day; 
c. On day on Easter Weekend; 
d. Memorial Day; 
e. Independence Day; 
f. Pioneer ^sy; 
g. Labor D3y? 
h. Thanksgiving? n^-5 
i. The day following Thanksgiving. 
10. The court further finds that it is appropriate that the 
defendant should have the Easter weekend of 1935 and that the 
plaintiff should have Memorial Day. The defendant will have 
Independance Day and the plaintiff will have Pioneer Day. The 
defendant will have Labor Day and the plaintiff will have 
Thanksgiving Day. Defendant will have them on the following dayf 
the day after Thanksgiving. 
11. The court further finds that the plaintiff should have 
the children on Fathers Day every year, whether it falls on his 
weekend or not. The court further finds that the defendant 
should have the children every Mothers Day whether it falls on 
plaintiffs weekend or not. 
12. The court further finds that with regard to Christmas, 
that the defendant should hsve the children c^orv other r^ cce^ .ber 
support of the- cefoniant^ reruect th?t: :.iv? be aiv^n ?. ~r.onev 
judgment in an .ir/junt equal to th?.t necessary to purchase her.lth 
insurance for the children for the remainder of their minority. 
5. The court further finds that both parties should be 
required to comply with the terms of the revised child support 
agreement, and that specifically, the plaintiff should reimburse 
the defendant for all of the childrens medical and dental bills 
which are not insured with th* exception of othodonture. The 
curt further finds that, in accordance with the original Decree 
of Divorce, the olaintiff should supply to the defendant a policy 
of life insurance on his life with a fice v^Iue of -10,030.90. 
6. The court further finds that with an ongoing ahild 
support obligation of 5440.00 per month, the plaintiff should be 
awarded the tax deductions on said minor children. 
7. The court finds that it is reasonable and equitable that 
the plaintiff should have visitation with the parties minor 
children every other weekend from Friday afternoon, after school, 
until 8:00 p.m. on Saturday night. The court further finds that 
religous training is important for the children however, that the 
plaintiff should have visitation during the afternoon, after 
church, each Sunday, until 6:00 p.m., and that the plaintiff 
should have such visitation so long as the children have their 
church schedule in the morning. If the church schedule changes 
to the afternoon, then the plaintiffs visitation should be from 
Friday after school until they need to be back with their mother 
for ^urnoses of attending church on punday. 
8. The court finds that the plaintiff should have visita-
therefore, a separc3te paragraph war ai^?^ to the Decree of 
Divorce to make the $440,00 per month payment clear. The court 
further finds that siad payment of $440.00 per month as child 
support was the courts order at the time of the Decree without 
regard to whether the house was sold or not. 
2. The court further finds that based on the evidence, the 
defendant waived her right to collect arrearages in child support 
for the period between the Decree of Divorce and the Revised 
Child Support Agreement entered into in November, 1980. The 
court further finds that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the 
Revised Child Support Agreement and that the defendant should be 
estopped from collecting arrearages in child support arising 
between the date of the child support agreement in November, 
1980, up to and including the month of February, 1935. The court 
finds the intention of the parties was, at the time of the 
revised child support agreement, that the defendant would only 
collect fromm the plaintiff frora that time forward the sura of 
$120.00 per month. The court further finds that the plaintiff 
relied on that. 
3. The court further finds that the defendant does not have 
the power to waivs future payments from this time forward, and 
that they are not hers to waive, but rather that they belong to 
the children. The court further finds that the plaintiff should 
be ordered to pay child support to the defendant at the rate of 
$440.00 per month from March, 1985, until further order of the 
court or terminated as a matter of law, 
4. The court finds that no evidence was presented in 
THE COURT having published its Findings of Fact, now makes 
the f u\ losing 
ZO^iZLU3lO%:Z OF L W 
1# That the defendant should be estopped from collecting 
unpaid child support based on arrearages which accrued anytime 
during the past from the date of the Decree of Divorce up until 
the last day of March, 1993, the court further concludes, 
however, as a matter of law, that the full amount of $443.00 per 
month should be naid to the -3efeni^nt by the olaintiff 03 and for 
child support beginning March 1st, 1935 and continuing thereafter 
until further court order, or as the obligation may otherwise be 
terminated as a matter of law, 
2. The defendant is not entitled to judgment as prayed for 
for money to buy health or life insurance. 
3. The court further concludes that the existing Decree of 
Divorce which awarded the plaintiff reasonable rights of visita-
tion ought to be defined and made specific, and that the plain-
tiff should be awarded those rights of visitation as outlined in 
the Findings of Fact immediately above. 
DATED this day of August, 1985. 
cott Daniels 
DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216 
AFFLECK & McPHIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
14 7 North Secon-3 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: 35!?-"mi 
T!3 THE DISTRICT CO:JRT OF ?HS THIRD 7UDTC IAL DISTRICT 
PJ »>ID FOR «?AL7 LATN'F COUNTY, FTAT2 OF UTAH 
ROF.SRT FCRRT3 BLAC53UR'!, TR. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROL J. BLACKBURN MOYES, 
Defendant. 
\ 
) 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANTS ORDERS TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
C i v i l No* C84-4490 
Judge Scott Daniels 
THIS MATTEER cane on for t r i a l at the regularly scheduled 
t i m e f t h a t being on the 5th d3y of March, 1985 , before the 
Honorable Judge Scott Danie ls . The p l a i n t i f f appeared in person 
and was represented by h i s c o u n s e l , David J* Berceau . The 
defendant appeared personal ly , and by and through her counsel , 
David A. McPhie. The court having cons idered the e v i d e n c e 
produced both in the form of t e s t imony and documentory, and 
having considered the f i l e , and having previous ly published i t s 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes the following 
ORDER 
1. It is hereby ordered that the defendant be estopped from 
collecting any arrearages in child support which may have accrued 
from the period beginning with th^ D^ cr*** of Vlvori? IT original-
ly granted in this matter, up to and including the last day of 
February, 1985, It is the further specific order of the court 
that the child support obligation of the plaintiff to the 
defendant a and for child support be in tv'- r-.oint r.r. "--^.^ *v::: 
month as originally outlined in the Deere 3 of Divorce b^ginnin? 
with March 1st, 1^35, snd thereafter until modified by court 
order or otherwise terminated as a natter of law* 
2. The defendant is denied judgment in the amount prayed 
for to purchase medical or life insurance, 
3* As a modification to the existing Decree of Divorce, 
which provides for simply reasonable and/or liberal rights of 
visitation, the plaintiff is hereby awarded the following 
specific rights of visitation: 
h. Every other weekend from Friday afternoon, after school, 
until 8:00 p.m. on Saturday night, and on Sunday afternoon after 
church, until 6:00 p.m., so long as the child have their church 
schedule on Sunday in the morning. If the church schedule 
changes to afternoons on Sunday, then the plaintiff shall have 
visitation from Friday after school, until time to prepare for 
church on Sunday afternoon. 
B. Plaintiff shall have visitation on the Thursdays of 
those weeks in which it is not his weekend from 4:00 until 8:00 
p.m. 
C. The plaintiff shall have visitation on every other 
holiday from the following list: 
a. New Years Day; 
b. Presidents Day; 
c. One day on Easter Weekend; 
d. Memorial Day; 
e. Independance Day; 
g. Labor O^y; 
h. Thanksgiving; ^ n-1 
i. The day following Thanksgiving. 
D. The plaintiff and defendant shall enjoy different 
holidays each year. Defendant shsll h*ve the Easter weekend of 
1935, plaintiff to have Memorial Day, etc. 
B. The plaintiff shall have the children on Fathers Day of 
each year, whether it falls on his visitation weekend or not. 
The defendant shall have visitation on Mothers Day of every year, 
whether it falls on her weekend or not. 
F. With regard to Christ!na3r the defendant shall have the 
children every other December 25th, and the plaintiff shall have 
them every other December 24th. Likewise in reverse the fol-
lowing year, to continue on alternating schedule yearly. For 
calendar year 1985, the plaintiff will have the children on 
December 24th, the defendant shall have them on December 25th. 
Unless mutually agreed upon by both parties, to consider travel-
ing plans, etc., this order thall be controlling for Christmas 
visitation. 
G. In regard to the childrens birthdays, the defendant 
shall have the children on their birthdays for the year of 1995, 
and on alternating years thereafter. The plaintiff to have the 
children on alternating ye^rs. On those years where the plaintiff 
does not have the childrens birthday visitation, he shall enjoy 
visitation on the evening of the next day after school* 
H. The plaintiff is hereby awarded one months continuous 
visitation to occur each sunder. The plaintiff is herebv 
roqujr^d to give? notice ?.s of \oril 15th of each veir n^ to which 
one l^onth bloc-; of tim:* in the sunnier h? intcni to exercise 
visitation. 
I. The plaintiff 5s hereby ordered to give* 43 hours notice 
if ho 3oes not intend to exercise his right of visitation as 
outlined above. 
4. Each of the Darties is ordered to pay their own costs of 
court and attorneys fees* 
DATED this day of flaa,,^^ , 1985. 
Tu/ge Scott Daniels 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING' 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct cooy of 
the foregoing Order to attorney for plaintiff, David J. Berceau, 
at 261 East 300 South, Suite 150, Salt Lake City, Dtah 34111f 
postage prepaid, on this day of August, 1995. 
Deborah Marr, Secretary 
DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY 6 McPHIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 484-7632 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT F. BLACKBURN, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROL J. BLACKBURN (MOYES), 
Defendant. 
ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC 
Civil No. C84-4490 
Judge Scott Daniels 
The above entitled matter came before this court for 
hearing on defendants motion to alter or amend the judgment on 
November 1, 1985. David J. Berceau appeared for plaintiff. 
David A. McPhire appeared for defendant. The order was submitted 
and signed by the court on January 31, 1986. The order does not 
appear of record, and the parties, have stipulated to an entry of 
an order nunc pro tunc. 
Pursuant to the stipulation and good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the motion 
of the defendant to alter or amend the judgment is denied. 
DATED this /ff—\3ay of fifvifl, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing order to attorney for plaintiff, David J. Berceau, 
at 261 East 300 South, Salt LaAe City, Utah 84111, postage 
prepaid, on this 23rd day of Aprily 1987. 
| N THE 
J8TATB^OF COLORADO; 
Civil Action NO. ;p-20328 
Division 1 
In re the Marriage of: 
CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, 
Petitioner, 
and 
ROBERT FARRIS, BLACKBURN, JR., 
Respondent. 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, STIPULATION AND CONTRACT entered 
into this 18th day of December, 1978, by and between Carol 
Jeanne Blackburn, the Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as 
"Wife" and Robert Farris Blackburn, Jr., the Respondent, here-
inafter referred to as "Husband"; and 
.WHEREAS, Petitioner and Respondent herein have instituted 
their action in the District Court in and for the County of 
Arapahoe, State of Colorado, being Civil Action No. D-20328; and 
WHEREAS, the Petitioner and Respondent have separated, 
and are not living together as Husband and Wife; and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties that 
a full and final adjustment of their property rights, interests, 
and claims be settled and determined by the parties to this 
Agreement, and that the provision be made for the custody and 
support of jthe<unemancipated minor children of the partiesi and 
WHEREAS, «ac^^f:ih# par tie i has read and ful^;iinder* 
sta»ls.the terms, eonditipnsaW provisions bi this Agr<*e**nt 
• •'
 i;
-^ .
1
 -^  '" • v • '• ' • - ^ X ^ ' I A : %^'i- r ?Sk-lV^'**•;$* 
believes itmHtttma^Hfe^^f^MtV adequate*';M^|ig^ofl^tf 
.and freely and fully accepts the provisions, terms, and conditions 
thereof. 
NOW THElOElFORE, in consideration of the parties and 
the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained, receipt 
and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged by each of the 
parties hereto, the parties mutually agree, stipulate and covenant 
as follows % 
1. RELEASE 
That except as specified in this Agreement, each party 
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obligations 
and liabilities for the future acts and duties of the other, and 
that each of said parties hereby releases the other from any 
and all liabilities, debts, or obligations of any kind or character 
incurred by the other, from and after this date, and from any 
and all claims, demands, including all claims of either party 
upon the other for maintenance of Wife or Husband or otherwise, 
it being understood that this.instrument is intended to settle 
the rights of the parties hereto in all respects, except as 
hereinafter provided. 
2. AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY 
That any and all property acquired from and after the 
date hereof shall be the sole and separate property of the party 
acquiring the same, and each of said parties hereby respectfully 
grants to the other all such further acquisitions of property 
as the sole and separate property of the one so acquiring the same. 
3. ESTATES 
That each of said parties shall have immediate right to 
dispose of by Will, his or her respective interest in any and 
all property belonging to him or her, or hereafter acquired by 
either of the respective parties, and each of the parties hereto 
hereby waives any am*-'all rights to the estate of the other, 
including the right to widow9s allowance, or any other rights 
SEPARATION 
The parties may and shall continue to live apart for 
the rest of their lives. Each shall be free from interference, 
direct or indirect, by the other as fully as though unmarried. 
Each may for his or her separate benefit, engage in any employment, 
business or profession he or she may choose. 
5. PROPERTY 
The parties make the following disposition and settlement 
with respect to their property. 
A. Real Property 
The parties are the joint owners of a residence 
located at 6518 South Dahlia Circle, Littleton, Colorado. 
That real property will remain as the joint property of the 
parties until such time in the future as they choose to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the property. 
The Husband will make the house payment as indicated 
below until such time as the house is sold. 
If the property is jointly owned at the time of 
the death of one of the parties, the deceased's interest shall 
pass to the children of the parties. The parties acknowledge 
that this Separation Agreement is not a Will. 
B. Personal Property 
1) The Wife will take as her sole property: 
a) All of the personal belongings now in 
her possession; 
b) The 1973 Volkswagen automobile; 
c) All bank accounts in her name; 
d * ; ^ 3 ^ ^ policies ;4t^ 
e) i,Two shares o£ >*odak Cesapany s tock / ski 
' i n jo in t ownership with Husband; 
f) The following items of furniture and 
Four brown chairs — woorf^rocker, and 
upholstered V~ 
Ottoman 
Cabinet humidifier 
End table 
China cabinet 
Two twin beds 
Two desks 
Small wood bookcase 
Small magazine rack 
Three dressers 
High chair 
35mm camera 
Garden cart 
Electric lawn mower 6 cord 
Bar-b-q Grill 
Pioneer stereo receiver 
Garard turntable 
Two KLH speakers 
Washer 
Dryer 
Refrigerator 
White couch 
Silverwear 
Corningware dishes 
Kitchen table & two chairs 
Four bent wood dining room chairs 
Typing table 
All lamps except those named as Husband's 
property 
Pendulum wall clock 
Electric typewriter 
Badminton set 
Croquet set 
Volleyball t net 
Picnic table & benches 
Picnic basket 
Christmas tree & decorations 
Girl's Schwinn bicycle 
Assorted Garden and Lawn tools 
Shop brooms 
Folding lawn chair 
Trash cans 4 cart 
Six-foot aluminum ladder 
All children's items 
Double bed 
Dresser with mirror 
Wall mirror 
Two yellow night stands 
Parsons dining room table 
Hide-a-bed couch 
End table (round) 
Director's chair 
Tall metal bookshelves 
Black wood bookshelves 
Green bean bag chair 
Blue antique chair 
White antique trunk 
Two pink suitcases 
Black/white TV 
Sewing machine & cabinet 
r^Mnot *tf»r*»o fc radio 
Wicker phone stand 
Kirby vacuum cleaner 
Guitar 
Antique Victrola 
Cedar chest 
Lennox china 
Crystal water goblets 
Instamatic camera 
Numerous books 
Numerous record albums 
Crock pot 
Pot and pan set 
Wood tennis racket & press 
Clothes hamper 
Two clock radios 
2) The Husband will take as his sole property: 
a) All of the personal belongings now in 
b) The 1967 Mercury automobile and the 1976 
his possession; 
Ford Pickup; 
c) All bank accounts in his name; 
d) All interest in insurance policies in 
his name except that the Husband will maintain life insurance 
in an amount of at least $10,000.00 on himself and shall name 
either the Wife or the children as beneficiaries. If at such time 
as that policy is cancelled by mutual agreement between the 
parties the Husband shall retain all cash value of the policy. 
e) U.S. Savings Bonds now in joint ownership 
with the Wife, of a value of approximately $360.00; 
f) The following items of furniture and 
household goods: 
White upholstered chair 
Beige chair & couch 
U.S. map 
Electric sander 
Floor lamp 
End table 
Green swag lamp 
Metal file cabinet 
2«arge metal bookcases 
Brown cane table lamp 
Flourescent light £ extension cord 
Two tennis racquets 
Crank Ice cream maker 
Wood foot locker 
iietal trunk 
'Two grey rs^itcaaes 
Blue suitcase 
8team iron 
Toaster 
Ironing board (yellow & white) 
GE canister vacuum 
Manual Royal typewriter 
Small B*BQ grill 
Two tool boxes 
Numerous tools 
VTM electronic instrument 
Encyclopedia Britanica 
Numerous record albums 
Binoculars 
Instamatic camera 
Trouble light 
Extension cord (50*) 
Lawn chair 
Miscellaneous pots 4 pans 
Golf clubs 
Oscillating fan 
Pop corn popper 
Short handled flat shovel 
6. DEBTS 
There are no outstanding joint debts of the parties 
other than the home mortgage which shall be paid by the Husband 
as set forth below. 
7. CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
It is agreed that the Wife is a fit and proper person 
to have custody of the children and that she shall have custody 
of the minor children of the parties, subject to reasonable and 
liberal visitation rights of the Husband. 
This provision is agreed to be in the best interests 
of the children at the present time.; 
8. CHILD SUPPORT 
-The Husband will pay «upport, torth^minoz ch4,ldreri 
lm$ /follows * 
is presently approximately $320,00 teach, »onth# by making said 
payment directly to,Mellon Mortgage Co.# on or before the first, 
of each month. This payment will include/and the Husband shall 
be responsible for, payments on the principal, interest, all taxes 
of these payments should increase, the Husband shall pay the 
increased amounts. 
b) The Husband will pay directly to the Wife the 
sum of $120.00 on or before the 20th of each month. 
c) The Husband will pay all medical, dental, and 
necessary orthondotia bills for the children and shall maintain 
health insurance for their benefit. The Wife will pay all 
costs for necessary medicines. 
9. MAINTENANCE 
Neither party shall pay maintenance to the other. 
10. ATTORNEY FEES 
The Husband shall pay to the Wife one-half the 
attorney fees and costs incurred by the Wife in this tion. 
11. RELEASE FROM LIABILITY 
The parties hereby mutually release and agree to 
hold harmless each other from all actions, claims and obligations 
which either of them had or may have against each other by reason 
of any cause up to the date of this agreement. 
12. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
No modification or waiver of any of the terms of 
this agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by 
both parties. 
This agreement shall be governed by the laws of 
the State of Colorado. 
This agreement constitutes the entire understanding 
of the parties. There are no agreements other than those set 
forth herein. 
Each pa :ty acknowledges that he or she has read 
this agreement, has been fully informed about this agreement, 
understands this agreement, and is signing this agreement freely and 
voluntarily. 
CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, Petitioner 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) S8. 
COUNTY OF _ ) 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this day 
Of , 1978, by CAROL JEANNE BLACKBURN, Petitioner. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, JR., Respondent 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this day 
Of , 1978, by ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, JR., 
Respondent. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY HF ARAPAHOE 
STATE OF COLORADO 
1 ^ ' » / . » ' * . 
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In re the Marriage of: 
CAROL.JEANNE BIACKBllRTL 
Petitioner 
and 
ROBERT FARRTS BT.APKBUPN, ...JR. 
Respondent 
CIVIL ACTION NOi=2fi325 _ 
DECREE 
(Dissolution of Marriage) 
This matter was heard on its merits on December 18 
was represented by KENNETH K. STUART 
_, 192? Petitioner!! 
, attorney of record; \\ 
respondent #(xppexi<aixb;"x::>:x2C txittorjKv :i-civ.r«) ( - M : 
aet appear i^ -yeracm^tvW i^t i^-u^y) (appeared>by xx:cxxa 
>atKaraW5^pp3ixtoiJ&p^ (appear.;.! in ;«.•;>-JR \\iv];-
out counsel). The Court has examined the record, heard the evidence and the ftuU.n.jit^ of v.awv, J, 
and based thereon, makes the following findings: ; 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action. I 
2. One of the parties, Cnrol J e a n n e Blackburn hasbc<-na»! *ul • :i:.ryo: ii:'.: 
state, for ninety days preceding the commencement of this proceeding. I 
i 
3. The marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken, j 
i 
4. The separation agreement between the parties, *(a copy of which is attache 1 l-.-r-to ;•.- K:: 
hibit A and incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim) has been considered by the Coin-; ;:.i.l is r,> \ 
unconscionable as to support, maintenance, and property. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a decr< J t.f i:i • lit; i :. 
entered, and the marriage between the parties hereto is hereby dissolved. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall perform the respective pro\ Ul i
 ; f the • •; 
ration agreement, attache' hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein as if set forlh \< rU.iim, :.< 
apply to each of them.t 
| 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the custody of the minor child r e n , Dft( v _. i *': i; 
BLACKBURN and GINA LORRAINE BLACKBURN be granted to the JleL i t U *>'«-' 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Cos*.! i.•:.• 
t h e Respondent s h a l l pay a t l e a s t $ 4 4 0 . 0 0 per rocMij .... 
s u p p o r t f o r t h e minor c h i l d r e n . 
..IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT TIES COURT RETAINS SUCH JURISDICTION OF THIS 
ACTION AS IS PROVIDED BY LAW. 
Dated this 11. day of _necenfcss
 r 1978 , a t Littlal.Qn,__. , 
Colorado. 
Approve^ ti3 to Fo; 
1/ 
Att&Wtar Petitioner f/]/^ Jtor*-Ji~m~'}A/' " x~/*> •-''^' 
DISTRICT JubcJE"/ 
Attorney for 
REVISED CHILD SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED between these two parties, 
Carol Seiler Blackburn and Robert Farris Blackburn, Jr., in 
regards to their divorce decree and separation agreement 
dated December 18, 1978, that the following changes be made: 
1. Robert will continue to pay Carol $120 per 
month for child support with an added inflation adjustment 
as follows: in January of each year, the monthly payment will 
increase by $10, ie, beginning January 1981, monthly payments 
will be $130; beginning January 1982, monthly payments will be 
$140, etc. 
2. Robert will pay all travel expenses of the 
children and himself associated with his reasonable and liberal 
visitation rights. 
3. Carol will take income tax deductions for the 
children so long as Robert is paying less than the IRS guide-
lines for monthly child support for qualifying exemptions. 
4. Carol will purchase medical insurance for the 
children on a group plan and Robert will reimburse Carol for 
the cost difference (if any) between single and family rates. 
5. Robert will continue to reimburse Carol for 
all the children's medical and dental bills (except orthodontia) 
Carol will continue to pay for all medicines for the children. 
November 13, 1980 . 
M T E CAROL SEILER feLACKBURti 
ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURK, JfT. 
November 9, 1983 
Robert Parris Blackburn, Jr. 
4600 East Kentucky, Apt. 401 
Denver, Colorado 80222 
REi Blackburn vs. Blackburn 
Divorce 
Civil Action No. D-20328 
Dear Mr. Blackburnt 
Recently Carol Moyes, your former wife, came to my office 
with some concerns about your failure to perform as ordered in 
the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
Her biggest concern was the sizeable arrearage in child 
support owed by you to her, for and on behalf of the children 
as outlined in the Stipulation which was made part of your Divorce 
Decree, in that Stipulation you were to pay the amount of Pour 
Hundred Porty Dollars ($440.00) per month as child support. A 
provision was made that you could be given credit toward child 
support for making the house payment in the amount of Three 
Hundred Twenty Dollars ($320.00) per month, as long as you were 
making those payments, and until the house was sold. That home 
was sold in August, 1979, and therefore, since that date the cash 
amount due your former wife as child support has been the $440.00 
amount. 
Briefly summarising the payments you have made since that 
time, one can quickly see the nature and amount of the arrearage. 
Our calculations are outlined belowt 
a. Prom September, 1979, through and including 
December of 1979, you paid only $120.00 per 
month and got behind in your child support 
obligation in the amount of One Thousand Two 
Hundred Eighty Dollars ($1,280.00) i 
b. Prom January, 1980, through and including 
December, 1980, again you only paid $120.00 
Robert Parris Blackburn, Jr. 
November 9, 1983 
Page -2-
each month, putting you in arrears an 
additional Three Thousand Eight Hundred Porty 
Dollars ($3,840.00) for the calendar year 
1980| 
c. Prom January, 1981, through December, 1981, 
you paid at the rate of $110.00 a month, which 
created an arrearage in child support for 
calendar year 1981 of Three Thousand Seven 
Hundred Twenty Dollars ($3,720.00)| 
d. Prom January, 1982, through December, 1982, 
you paid child support at the rate of $140.00 
each month which created an arrearage of Three 
Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($3,600.00) for 
calendar year 1982; and 
e. Prom January, 1983, through the present, which 
is November, 1983, you've paid child support 
at the rate of $150.00 a month, which so far 
in this year, 1983, puts you Three Thousand 
One Hundred Ninety Dollars ($3,190*00) for 
this year. 
Your total arrearage can be calculated from adding the above 
sums. You are presently Fifteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty 
Dollars ($15,630.00) in arrears in your child support obligation. 
Mr. Blackburn, your former wife has showed to me the revised 
child support agreement document which is one (1) page in length, 
has five (5) paragraphs, and is dated November 13, 1980. Raving 
listened to my client carefully explain the circumstances under 
which that document was signed, it has become clear to me that 
that it is unenforceable. Your former wife was not only under 
duress at the time she signed it, but was not represented by 
counsel, and the court will simply not let you two, by private 
agreement, amend or change it's order. Especially under the 
circumstances, by which you obtained her signature on that 
document. The arrearage as stated above is the amount owed, and 
the amount of a judgment which we would expect to obtain against 
you if this matter cannot be worked out short of going to court. 
Be advised that my client is not anxious to take you to 
court, but will if she needs to to get the money* We have a 
Robert Parris Blackburn, Jr. 
November 9, 1983 
Page -3-
proposal to make that we hope that you will find acceptable. 
If you will sign it, I will send to you a Promissory Note which 
you can sign, promising to pay to my client the arrearage in the 
amount of Fifteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Dollars ($15,630.00) 
through November, 1983. That note will bear no interest and can 
be paid over a period of five years. 
Your alternative if you do not choose to either sign this 
note or make other arrangements with your former wife will be 
for us to go to court in the State of Colorado to obtain 
judgment. Be advised that a judgment when obtained will bear 
interest. 
My client is now not employed and her insurance will end 
at the end of November of this year. You should prepare yourself 
to provide the insurance coverage which would be necessary under 
the Decree, in that should you fail, this also will become an 
issue before the court. 
We hope you can see the advisability of contacting myself 
or my client directly at your earliest convenience so that these 
matters can be worked out. Tf we are forced to take you to court, 
we will be asking the court to hold you in contempt for failure 
to obey it's lawful order as contained in the Decree, and to both 
fine you and incarcerate you for your willfull disregard for their 
order. 
GOVERN YOORSELP ACCORDINGLY, 
APPLECR & McPHIE 
David A. McPhie, Esq. 
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4 
1
 March 5# 1985 
2
 CAROL JEAN MOYES, 
3
 I called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
5
 as follows: 
6
 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7
 BY MR, McPHIE; 
8
 Q Mrs. Moyes, would you state your name and 
9
 address? 
10 A Carol Jean Moyes, 1678 East 7200 South, Salt 
11 Lake City. 
12 Q Have you heard the testimony Mr. Blackburn about 
13 visitation? 
u
 I A Yes. 
Q Do you agree with the testimony he's given in 
terms of the way visitation has been in the past? 
17 | A Well, he has definitely his side to think that 
--I guess the times and dates he has because he has kept 
track of it for the last six years. Are you talking about 
20
 | that side of it? 
21 I THE COURT: I think you should ask her a specific 
22
 ' question. Don't ask her to compare the testimony. 
23 I Q (By Mr. McPhie) With regard to since Mr. 
24
 Blackburn has been here in the State of Utah the last 10 
25
 months, has there been difficulty between you on visitation? 
15 
16 
18 
19 
A He called one day in April and said he was in 
town for a few days. He'd like to see the children. At 
which time I opened my home to him and asked him if he would 
like to come and visit them the next day, and he did. I 
at that time after he visited with the children, they went 
outside and played in the snow. I think they built a snow-
man. He came in the house and made his way through my home 
—basically let me see your bedroom and that didn't set 
the tone very good. Before he left, I asked him what his 
intentions were. And at that time he was very aggressive 
and offensive, that I'm going to see the kids every six 
weeks in the Summer, every other weekend and one day a week. 
Then his whole attitude just kind of put me on the 
defensive. It was a tone that he had during our marriage, 
me Tarazan, you Jane. And the visitation that he had and 
that he got for that time hence was probably very limited. 
I had told him that day before he left, if you don't like 
that way—or if you want visitations set up that way, then 
let's go to court and get it settled there. I'm not going 
to agree to that just here today. And that's how it's been. 
As I basically said, let's go to court and get it settled. 
Q Did you and he experience difficulty in terms 
of agreeing how much was appropriate visitation during the 
Summer of 1984? 
A Every time he called, there was problems. He 
4 
1
 would call and ask for the children like the next day. 
2
 Well, we had basically plans throughout the Summer and have 
3
 J company through the Summer and have plans for that period 
of time. He called one time when we had company for out 
5
 of town for a two-week period, and I did tell .him we're 
6
 going to be busy doing things for the next two weeks, donft 
7
 bother to call, no, I think I'll continue to call. 
8
 He made—there were several threatening phone 
9
 I calls that if I loved Jack and Kristen, I wouldn't deny 
him, and that one of these days, this would blow up in my 
11 I face. And another comment was — 
12 I MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I'll 
object and ask that the question be directed to the witness, 
so formal objections--and instead of a narrative. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Did he ever threaten you? 
A* Yes. 
10 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1? Q What d id he say? 
18 A Well, there were the threatening phone calls. 
19
 The last — 
20 Q What did he say? 
21 I A If you love Jack and Kristen, you won't deny 
221
 me. Another time was—now I lost my train of thought. 
23
 I One of these days this is going to blow up in your face. 
24
 I Q What did you understand that to mean? 
A I didn't know if he was going to come and bomb 25 
the house or what. I have no idea what the man is capable 
of any more. 
Q What's your feeling about how much visitation 
he should have? 
A What's my idea of what visitation should be? 
Q Yeah. 
A Well, we went through that last week when we 
were out in the home. Visitation would be every other week-
end, basically right after school on Friday, till like 8:00 
o'clock on Sunday. We're family oriented, and we do go 
to church, and Sundays is always a big family dinner and 
family activities on Sundays. So I'd prefer he not have 
them then. He has been getting the children Sunday after-
noons, and I guess he should keep having that. But it does 
take away from our family time. If we were to get Sundays, 
I would let him—he's got them two hours on Thursdays. 
I would let him have them three, four hours, three hours, 
maybe from like 3:30 in the afternoon until 7:30 on— 
Q Alternating Thursdays? 
A Alternating Thursdays. 
Q What else do you think is fair? 
A Well, every other legal holiday. I don't know 
that I agree with the 12 legal holidays that the court some 
times sets up. It's hard, like when the girls are in school 
on the legal holiday, school evenings are hard with their 
6 
7 
1 f
 studies and everything, I've had to take them out of piano 
2
 because it got kind of jumbled up in there with his 
3
 I visitation. 
1
 Q How about Thanksgiving, how do you think that 
5
 | ought to be handled? 
A Here again, we're very family—oriented family, 
and Thanksgiving, we're always together with family. And 
8 the girls enjoy having the turkey and everything rather than 
9
 going over there and having hamburger and green beans. 
10 Q Do you think he should have some time of the 
tt Thanksgiving? 
12 A Oh, definitely. But since he doesn't have maybe 
13
 that much to offer them as a holiday spirit type thing, 
14
 I would prefer them being with us on Thanksgiving. 
15
 I Q How about at Christmas, what do you think should 
be done there? 
A Here again, because he's either atheist or 
agnostic, I'm not sure he knows what he is, and Christmas 
is not that big of a deal to him, but it is to us, arid since 
we have been going out of town every Christmas and spending 
Christmas day, Christmas Eve, and a few days afterwards 
—what we did this year, he got them like from the 28th 
23
 | on until they had to go back to school, which included New 
Year's Eve and New Year's Day. 
Q Do you think that's a good way to handle it? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
A I think so. 
Q How about the Summer, how much visitation should 
he have? How old are the children? 
A They are eight and ten. 
Q How much visitation should he have in the Summer? 
A I would like—well, it depends on whether he's 
working or not. If he's working, no company is going to 
give him more than two weeks. And I would feel very uncom-
fortable having my children taken to a daycare or left in 
an adult apartment situation where they are just kind of 
left on their own. I don't leave my children that much 
on their own. Daisy is getting to an age where she's almost 
able to babysit, but not quite at age 10. And I leave them 
with my Mother most of the time and other adults. I don't 
even—haven't left them with many teenagers. I guess maybe 
too protective with them. I'd hate to think of them being 
left alone if he was working. 
Q You're willing to have him have them on Father's 
Day? 
A Yes. He is their Father. 
Q How about on their birthdays? 
A Well, here again, if it's a school day—like 
Gina's was this last year when it was on a Friday. I mean, 
when do I get her? It was his weekend, which meant he 
picked them up at, I think it was 6:00 o'clock, you know. 
8 
4 
1
 I barely get her ready for school. She's off in school 
2 all day long. I get her for a couple of hours, and then 
3] he takes them for the whole weekend. He did bring her back 
for, you know, deliver her to her own party, which it kind 
5 I of put a damper on the birthday party on Saturday. 
• Q Assuming the Court gives Mr. Blackburn a period 
7 of continuous visitation in the Summer, what kind of notice 
8 do you think is appropriate for you to have, if any, of when 
9 he'll have them? 
10 A For Summer visitation, I would hope before they 
11 are out of school so we could make our Summer vacation 
12 plans. We usually make a trip back to Ohio for a two-week 
13 period every Summer. So I don't know, a couple of months 
14 advance notice. I don't know what would be adequate, but 
15 a lot. 
16 Q Let me ask you one question about the visitation 
17 that happened or that was going on while you were in Utah 
18
 after you left Colorado, but before you married Mr. Moyes. 
19 How was visitation going, then? 
20 A When he would come over for a week at a time, 
21 it was about every three months. What I tried to do is 
22
 put the shoe on the other foot and figure how I would want 
23 to be treated as the parent without custody. 
24
 He would come over. I would try and not be in 
25
 the home much because there was conflict. He seems to think 
1 it was going real well, but I tried not to be around much. 
2 He would get to see the children all day long, and Daisy, 
3
 after she got into kindergarten, then when she wasn't in 
4
 school. 
5 Q Did he stay in your Mother1s home? 
6
 A Yes. He stayed there and ate our food and did 
7
 not ever—well, not ever give us a thank you, but I think 
8 a couple of times he said thanks. 
9 Q Do you and Mr. Blackburn exchange harsh words 
10 in connection with picking up and delivering the children 
11 from visitation times now? 
12 A In the last month or six weeks there has been 
13 absolutely no communication between us. In August— 
14
 MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. I think 
15 I it's been answered. 
THE COURT: What's the objection, Mr. Berceau? 
MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. He asked 
a question, yes or no question. She gave the answer. 
THE COURT: She's trying to respond to the 
quest ion. That's true. 
21 | Q (By Mr. McPhie) What kinds of difficulties have 
you had in your discussions with him in connection with 
picking them up and delivering them and, say, since August 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
22 
23 
2* of '84? 
25 A Well, at the end of August, he has pled guilty 
10 
1 
1 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
to an assault charge. 
MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Tell me about the conversations 
you had with him. Just—are you having difficulty? Do 
you talk about the difficulty you're having? 
A We don't have any conversations. 
MR. McPHIE: Okay. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I ask 
that be stricken from the record. 
THE COURT: It will be stricken from the record. 
Please try to answer the question. 
MR. McPHIE: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 
MR. BERCEAU: I do have a few questions. 
16
 | CROSS-EXAMINATION 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
BY MR. BERCEAU: 
Q Is it true that you've never given him a Thanks-
giving for visitation since you've moved to Utah? 
A I'm sorry. That I've never given him a Thanks-
giving? 
Q He never had Thanksgiving Day for visitation 
23
 I since you moved to Utah by himself? 
24
 | A I don't think he's had a Thanksgiving visitation, 
25
 ' Q Is it true he's never had Christmas Day as a 
11 
4 
1
 visitation? 
2 A I don't think so. 
3 J Q You made a comment about hamburger and green 
beans. Was that supposed to be their dinner on Thanksgiving 
5 with him? 
6 A O h — 
7
 MR. McPHIE: Objection, argumentative. 
8 MR. BERCEAU: I'm asking her a question, Your 
9 Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Well, what's your question you're 
11 asking her? What she meant by that? 
12 MR. BERCEAU: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 J THE COURT: Okay. You can ask that question. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, it's just when the girls come 14 
15 home and we ask them what they've done or anything, ham-
16
 burger and green beans seems to be the major portion of 
17
 what he feeds them. 
18
 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Do you ever feed your kids 
19
 hamburger? 
20
 A Not every time I see them. 
21
 Q You do feed them hamburger? 
22
 A Sometimes. 
23 Q You fed them beans before? 
24
 A I have. It's one of their favorites. 
25
 MR. BERCEAU: No questions. 
12 
4 
15 
16 
17 
18 
1
 THE COURT: Mr. McPhie? 
2
 MR. McPHIE: No further questions. 
31 THE COURT: Any more witnesses on visitation? 
MR. McPHIE: -No, there are no witnesses. 
5
 (Whereupon, the Judge ruled on the issue of 
6
 I visitation.) 
7
 THE COURT: Do you want to proceed on your 
8 counterclaim, Mr. McPhie? 
9
 MR. McPHIE: I call Mrs. Moyes. 
10
 J THE COURT: Mrs. Moyes, you understand for the 
record that you are still under oath? 
12
 I MRS. MOYES: Yes, I do. 
*3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
14
 J CAROL JEAN MOYES, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant, 
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19
 | BY MR. McPHIE 
20
 I Q Mrs. Moyes, I'd like to show you a document, 
21
 | it's marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 17, and ask you if 
22 i . 
* you recognize it? 
23 J A This is the separation agreement when we were 
24
 divorced. 
25
 Q Are you familiar with what the original looked 
13 
1 like? 
2 A As far as I know, it looked just like this. 
3 Q Does that appear to be a true and accurate copy 
4
 of it? 
5 A Yes. 
6
 Q Does that separation agreement contain any 
7
 provisions about child support? 
8 A I should know that right off the bat. 
9 THE COURT: Well, it speaks--
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, it does, No. 8. 
11 MR. McPHIE: Does the Court got the document? 
12 THE COURT: It speaks for itself. 
13 MR. McPHIE: We won't go into that. 
14
 THE COURT: At least, I assume, the one in the 
15
 file is the same as the one you've shown her? 
16
 MR. McPHIE: I believe it is. 
17
 THE COURT: All right. 
18
 Q (By Mr. McPhie) What were you supposed to pay 
19
 as child support according to the divorce in Colorado? 
20 MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. I think 
21
 that's in evidence. 
22
 THE COURT: Sustained. 
23 MR. BERCEAU: It speaks for itself. 
24
 THE COURT: It certainly does speak for itself. 
25
 Sustained. 
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18 
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Q (By Mr. McPhie) Has Mr. Moyes. —or Mr. Blackburn 
paid you all the child support that you were awarded? 
A Until I left Colorado, he paid the 440 which 
included the house payment plus 120 a month. And then, 
since that time, he's paid me the 120. And November of 
'80, we had an escalation agreement that he would pay $10.00 
a month more per year after that, just as an inflation. 
Q When did you—when the house was sold, did he 
pay you any money, the 320 that represented the house pay-
ment after that? 
A No. 
Q When was the house sold? 
A August of '79. 
Q Did he ever pay you since the house was sold 
in August of '79 the $320.00 portion that had gone to the 
house? 
A 
before 
need 
have 
$320 
a 
Q 
a 
.OC 
A 
I 
No. He told me he wouldn't. 
quit mine to go back to 
MR. 
school. 
BERCEAU: Objection, Your 
non-narrative answer. 
THE 
(By 
COURT: Sustained 
Mr. McPhie) Did ' 
discussion with him about 
1? 
Yes When I decided -
Just 
you ever 
He quit his job 
Honor. I would 
answer the question. 
have—did you ever 
the payment of that 
to sell the house and go 
15 
back to school. 
Q When did you have that discussion? 
A It was probably the Spring or Summer of *79, 
I decided to go back, and he told me that— 
THE COURT: No. Just answer the questions. 
The question was when. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Do you remember where you were 
when you had the discussion? 
A I don't know exactly. I imagine it was in the 
living room of the home. I think that's where it was. 
Q Did he express any—did he say anything about 
the $320.00 portion of the child support payment at that 
time? 
A I don't know if it was at that time or not. 
Q Has he ever since? 
A Before I left, he told me he wouldn't pay me 
the child support if I took his kids out of Colorado. 
Q Have you ever had any subsequent discussions 
of that amount of money/that 320 portion of the child 
support? 
A In Utah at one time I brought it up, and he told 
me he had been to an attorney, and they laughed at the 
divorce decree or the separation agreement and said there 
was no way he owed it. 
JJL 
—^ 
Q Let me show you what's been marked as Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 18 for identification and ask you do you recog-
nize that? 
A Yes. That's an agreement that I typed up and 
we both signed in November of '80. 
MR. McPHIE: And does the Court have a copy? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I would 
submit the original, if they'd like. 
MR. McPHIE: That's good. Why don't we give 
it to the Court. 
MR. BERCEAU: And I have no objection to it being 
entered. 
THE COURT: What exhibit is that? 
MR. BERCEAU: It's marked P-6. 
MR. McPHIE: The record should indicate that 
the Defendant's Exhibit 18 and Plaintiff's Exhibit P-6 is 
an original and a copy. 
THE COURT: They will both be received. 
MR. McPHIE: Let me give the Court the Plain-
tiff's and leave the Defendant's in her possession for 
purposes of answering questions. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Can you tell me the circum-
stances that surrounded the signing of that document? 
A He had come over for one of his one-week visits. 
17 
1 It was the one in November. And I had approached him about 
2 some doctor bills that he hadn't paid. He told me I was 
3 a lousy Mother, that the children shouldn't have that many 
4 ear infections, and sitting down and finally signing this 
5 was a way for me to get—make sure that I got the reimburse-
6 ment for the doctor bills. And it was an escalation on 
7 what he was paying—what he was paid. And he wanted to 
S put these other things in, I guess, to make sure he was 
9 covered. 
10 Q Did you understand at the time you signed that, 
H that you would be giving up the $320.00 portion of the child 
12 support? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Was that your intention at the time? 
15 A Not at all. 
16 Q Was it discussed at the time? 
17 A No. If there was any discussion, I can't remem-
18 ber it. If there was—and he was saying that it, it took 
19 away the 320, then I was not in agreement. And that's 
20 probably why it wasn't mentioned. 
21 Q Have you ever since then had a discussion with 
22 him in which you forgave the $320.00 portion of the child 
23 support? 
24 A Never. In fact— 
25 MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. 
18 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
0 (By Mr. McPhie) Have you ever asked him for 
the $320.00 portion of the child support payment? 
A One phone call he made during the Summer of '83, 
he was talking about what normal visitation was. And I 
said, "Well, then, let's talk about normal child support, 
too", at which time he didn't say any more about visitation, 
Q Have you written him concerning the 320 portion?* 
A Yes. 
MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. You can answer the 
question, just answer the question, please. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) In your letter to him, did you 
ask him to pay the arrearages in child support? 
A It was the letter we had you write, yes. 
Q Did he pay them? 
A No. 
Q Has there ever been a motion or a petition made 
in any court to change the child support obligation? 
A No. 
Q Did you ask me to represent you in this matter? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you and I have an agreement concerning 
attorney fees? 
A Well, there was a retaining fee, and then just 
19 
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whatever. 
Q 
matter? 
A 
0 
Have you paid attorney fees so far in th 
Yes, I have. 
How much have you paid? 
A It was probably a thousand or almost 1,100 so 
far* That doesn't include this month, 
MR. McPHIE: I have no other questions for Mrs. 
Moyes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Berceau? 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I would 
ask the Court to put Mr. Blackburn on as rebuttal witness 
and later call Mrs. Moyes as an adverse party and pursue 
with my cross-examination and questions then. 
THE COURT: No. You can cross examine her. 
MR. BERCEAU: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BERCEAU: 
Q Mrs. Moyes, I'm going to ask you some questions 
and hopefully I'll phrase them so you can understand them, 
and I—hopefully I'll ask you yes or no questions and ask 
you to answer that way, if you would. 
A Okay. 
Q Is it true you have three children now, Daisy, 
Gina, and Kristine? 
20 
A Kristen. 
Q Kristen? And you're expecting another? 
A Right. 
Q And the two children as you said are Robert's, 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you go to elementary school? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you go to high school? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have a college education almost? 
A Almost. 
MR. McPHIE: Objection, immaterial. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, the materiality is 
whether or not she knew what she was doing when she was 
signing this, relevant to her competence to English and 
grammar and the signing of a document. 
THE COURT: I suppose it is relevant to that 
issue. Overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Are you one college class short 
of your degree in interior design at the Y? 
A Yes. 
Q And when you moved to Utah in 1979, did you move 
to finish your B.Y.U. degree? 
A Yes, I did. 
21 
1 Q And at that time were you three semesters short 
2 of your degree? 
3 A Yes. 
4
 Q You're not employed now? 
5 A No. 
6
 Q Was your last job as a secretary for the L.D.S. 
7
 Church Welfare Services? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And did you quit in August of '83? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And it was in August of '83 when you sent that 
12 letter demanding arrearages of support? 
13 A No. 
*
4
 Q It was in 1983? 
15 A Yes. 
16
 Q Prior to that job, had you been employed at Conin 
17
 Design? 
18
 A Yes. 
19
 J Q You were full time employed before you quit? 
20 A Which job? 
21 J Q At Conin Design, excuse me. 
A Yes. 22 
24 
23 Q And prior to that, you were a part-time employee 
while you went to school at Conin Design? 
25
 A Right. 
22 
Q And that was interior design? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Prior to moving to Utah, did you have a job as 
a secretary? 
A Yes. 
Q When you quit Conin Design, you then went back 
to secretarial? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Required you to do typing as a secretary? 
A Right. 
Q You hired a lawyer for your divorce of Robert, 
is that true? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And that would have been in September, 1979? 
A 
Q 
the house? 
A 
Q 
Data? 
A 
Controlled 
Q 
Thereabouts, yes. 
And about October 1979, did Robert move from 
I guess it was October. I didn't write it down. 
At that time were you secretary for Controlled 
I don't think I started until November with 
Data. 
Were you making approximately $750.00 a month 
net for Controlled Data? 
A Yes. 
^ ^ _ 23 
1 THE COURT: Are these questions still intended 
2 to go to her understanding, her education? 
3 MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time, Your 
4
 Honor, they are going to testimony as to at the time of 
5 the separation concerning the separation and the divorce 
6
 decree, whether she had an attorney. And I'm going to go 
7
 into what they discussed at that time. 
8 THE COURT: Well, that's not — 
9 MR. BERCEAU: Between Rob— 
10 THE COURT: I don't think her income or her 
11 employment is relevant. 
12 MR. BERCEAU: Well, Your Honor, we have a claim 
13 of equitable estoppel. And with respect to equitable 
estoppel, we have to say the facts that occurred at that 
15 I time upon what the people relied and the benefits Mr. 
16
 Blackburn gave up. And I'm going into detail with respect 
17
 I to this situation at the time. I believe it's relevant 
to equitable estoppel, and I think the record will show 
later/ that I would proffer that it will be relevant, and 
it will show and go to equitable estoppel. 
THE COURT: All right. Subject to it being for 
that, I suppose I will let it in. I have a hard time under-
23 1 standing how it's going to be relevant. 
24
 I MR. McPHIE: Your Honor, can I raise an 
objection? I want to say this. What went on in 
24 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
25 
1 negotiation or discussion prior to that divorce is merged 
2 into the decree and is now barred from consideration by 
3 the fact that we can't look behind the decree now. We have 
4
 to go with what the decree says. 
5 THE COURT: I think the decree is ambiguous 
6 enough, it requires some explanation. Overruled. 
7 MR. BERCEAU: Thank you. Your Honor. 
8 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Robert didn't have a lawyer; 
9 is that correct? 
10 A No. He chose not to have one. 
11 Q And after you went to see a lawyer, you and 
12 Robert discussed your settlement of the properties, support 
13 payment, and visitation; isn't that correct? 
14 A I can't remember how it all came about, but we 
15 — I remember going through the household goods and making 
16 a list of who got what. 
17 Q And you talked with Robert regarding support 
18
 before you were divorced? 
19 A I can't remember how we came up with the extra 
20 120 a month. I cannot remember that. 
21 Q But you did have those discussions regarding 
22
 support? 
23 A Right. And he came up with the 120. He did 
24 all the finances. 
25 Q Okay. And you did do a separation agreement 
25 
1 that you've shown to the Court? 
2 A Right. 
3 Q Before the separation agreement, you discussed 
4
 the terms of the agreement with him, didn't you? 
5 A I imagine I did. 
* Q You agreed for continued joint ownership of the 
7
 home? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And prior to your divorce, you—and the separ-
10 ation agreement, you didn't have any discussions regarding 
11 when the home would be sold, did you? 
12 A No. I had no idea at that time. 
13 Q You left that indefinite intentionally? 
14
 A Not intentionally. I had no idea where my life 
15 would take me. 
16
 Q The $320.00 Robert—that you claim as support, 
17
 he paid that directly for the house payment, did he not, 
18
 to the finalization? 
19
 A Right. He would make the house payment, the 
20 check. He continued to do so. 
21 Q And it was your agreement that he would make 
22
 the house payment, then? 
23 A Uh-huh. 
24
 I Q And the figure of $120.00 would be paid directly 
to you; isn't that correct? 
26 
25 
1 A Right. 
2 Q Did you approach Robert about selling the home? 
3 A Yes. 
4
 Q And that would have been in April of 1979, 
5 approximately? 
6 A Approximately, yes. 
7 Q You wanted to sell the home so you could leave 
8 Colorado and come to Utah and attend B.Y.U.? 
9 A Yes. I saw that as the means for supporting 
10 myself through college as my equity in the home. 
11 Q Is it your knowledge that Robert didn't want 
12 to sell the home when you proposed it? 
13 A As I recall, he had mentioned at one time renting 
14 the home, but I didn't see that as a means of my having 
15 the finances to go to school. I also approached him on 
16 buying my share of the equity, then he could have the house 
17I because he was interested in it as an investment. 
18 Q And Robert indicated to you that he was inter-
19 ested in the home as an investment? 
20 A Uh-huh. 
21 MR. McPHIE: I object, Your Honor, on materiality 
22 basis, relevancy. I don't understand what the line of 
23 questioning leads to. 
24 MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor — 
25 THE COURT: I don't, either, on that. 
27 
* MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, with respect to investor 
2 ment in the home, it's his benefit that he had from the 
3
 divorce, Your Honor, which we will proffer to show she 
4
 coaxed him into giving that up in order he pay her $120.00 
5 a month and allow her to sell the home. That's the essence 
6
 of our equitable estoppel argument, Your Honor. It's the 
7 "benefit he gave up at her insistance. 
8 MR. McPHIE: I renew the objection based on 
9 merger and bar, have to do with the documents of '78. 
10 THE COURT: You're talking about something that 
11 happened with the document, that's the problem I see. 
12 You're talking about something that happened after the 
13 divorce when she wanted to move to Utah? 
14
 MR. BERCEAU: Correct, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Overruled. You can ask her, I guess. 
16
 J Q (By Mr. Berceau) Did you go back and forth with 
respect to ideas on selling the home with Robert at your 
suggestion? 
*
9
 A As I recall there was discussion. 
20 Q Now, with respect to the home, did Robert offer 
21 I to pay you $120.00 support after the home was sold? 
A He told me that's all he would pay me. 
23 1 Q Okay. Now, I'd like to—can you recall your 
24
 J statement previously that you said that Robert would not 
pay you any support if you left? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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24 
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A 
thing. 
As I recall he told me he wouldn't pay me any-
He wasn't going to make it easy for me to leave 
the state with his children. And then I think he had second 
thought 
Q 
nothing 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
recall. 
0 
leaving 
s and decided to pay me the 120. 
And did you think that this was better than 
*> 1 
• 1 
I did. 
The home was sold, wasn't it? j 
It was. 
And you received approximately $13,000.00? 
Somewhere in there, 13,000. 
A little bit more? 
I think it was a little bit over. I can't 
After you—excuse me, with respect to your 
for Utah, did you have discussions regarding insur-
ance with Robert? 
A 
had set 
I don't know if it was before I left, but we 
it up that I would buy insurance, group insurance, 
family insurance, and he would pay the difference from the J 
single to a family. 1 
Q 
A 
he didn 
Q 
And he's paid that, hasn't he? I 
He stopped paying that in January of '83 because 
1t believe in insurance. 
Okay. Let me back up a second. You moved to 
29 1 
1 Utah and got insurance through the Y family plan? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And he reimbursed you for that insurance? 
4
 A Yes. 
5 Q And you went to school up until '83? 
6 A I was supposed to have graduated in December 
7 of '80. That's when I didn't go to school any more in 
8 December of '80. 
9 Q And up until—and you had B.Y.U. family insurance 
10 until then? 
11 A Until that last semester, yes. 
12 Q And he paid all that insurance, the difference? 
13 A Right. 
14 Q And you agreed with him to change the insurance 
15 as it was written in your separation agreement to a family 
16 plan, and he would reimburse you? 
1? A Right. 
18
 Q Now, that separation agreement, was that prepared 
19 by your attorney? 
20 A Yes, it was. 
21 Q And the home was joint property after the 
22
 divorce? 
23 A Y e s . 
24 Q The home was never deeded to you? 
25 A No. 
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Q And Robert would make the house payments until 
such time as it was sold? 
A Right. 
Q And it's true that he was supposed to pay $120.00 
to you by the 20th of each month? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And that he's paid that? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it also true that you agreed in that separ-
ation agreement that you could modify or have a waiver as 
long as it was in writing and signed by other parties? 
A I don't know. Is that in there? I — 
Q Okay. Did you read the separation agreement? 
A Not recently. I'm sure Robert has read it. 
Q 
Exhibit D-
Could you 
not? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I'm pointing your attention to the Defendant's 
-18. I'd like to point that document to you. 
look at it? You typed that document, did you 
Yes, I did. 
You typed the first paragraph? 
Yes. 
You typed the whole thing? 
Yes. 
You've signed it? 
I did. 
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1 Q And you made copies of it and provided it to 
2 Robert? 
3 A I probably did. I had access to a xerox machine, 
4
 Q And your signature is on there? 
5 A Uh-huh. 
6 Q And Robert1s signature is on there? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q You had discussions with Robert about the con-
9 tents of that document before you typed it? 
10 A I'm sure we discussed it before we sat down. 
11 And I sat down and he stood over me while I typed it. 
12 Q But you did have discussions before you typed 
13 it? 
14 A We probably talked about the different things 
15 we wanted included in it. 
16 Q You read it before you signed it? 
17 A I'm sure I did. 
18 Q Did you want the escalation in there from 
19 $120.00 because of inflation at $10.00 per year? 
20. A I thought that was a nominal amount to ask for. 
21 Q And you asked for it and got it? 
22
 A Yes. 
23 Q Is that travel expenses that Robert would pay, 
24 J something that Robert suggested? 
A I imagine I suggested it. I can't remember. 
32 
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1
 Q It's true that that is not travel expenses, is 
2
 J not part of your original divorce decree and separation 
agreement? 
A Since I didn't know I would be leaving the state, 
5
 I I doubt if it was included in there. 
6
 Q The tax deduction for the children would be taken 
7
 by Robert, is that true? 
8
 A I'm sure, 
9
 THE COURT: That's not what it says, but it says 
10 what it says. So you don't need to ask questions about 
11 it 
12 J Q (By Mr. Berceau) With respect to the tax 
discussion, was that in the separation agreement and divorce 
or is there something new? 
15
 | A I can't remember if it's in the separation agree-
16 !
 ment or not. 
17 | Q Okay. With respect to the medical insurance, 
18
 • was that a change from the divorce agreement? 
19 | THE COURT: Don't ask her what the documents 
say. They speak for themselves. Just ask her—if you want 
21
 I to ask what it means to her or something, that's fine. 
22
 MR. BERCEAU: Thank you. 
23 J THE COURT: I don't want you asking her about 
a paragraph, what it says. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Did you think that after that 
33 
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14 
20 
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25 
1 document was signed, that Robert had agreed to pay you 
2 $200.00 support per month? 
3 THE COURT: 200? 
4
 THE WITNESS: Yes. No, probably the 120 and 
5 then anything for doctor bills or insurance, reimbursement. 
6 I — I don't know where 200 would come from. 
7
 Q Did you suggest to him that if you—that if he 
8 was just going to pay the 120 in 1980, then you would take 
9 the girls as a deduction? 
10 A As I recall he kept telling me something about 
11 I.R.S. guidelines, and I had no idea what he was talking 
12 about. I just took his word for it. What that all meant, 
13 to this day, I still don't know. 
14
 Q It might be my former question. After that 
15 document was executed, did you tell Robert in a letter that 
*6 you thought that he had agreed to pay $200.00 support per 
17
 I month? 
A I got that, a copy of that letter from you, and 
19I I have no idea where I came up with the $200.00 figure. 
20 Q But you did say that to him in the letter? 
21 J A I must have. It's right there. 
Q And you also told him that if he was just going 
23I to pay the $120.00 in 1980, that you would then take the 
24 J girls as a deduction? 
A I don't remember saying that to him. 
18 
22 
25 
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1
 Q Could that be in the letter? 
2
 A I have no idea. 
3
 I Q I'd like to show you what's been marked for 
identification, P-8, Plaintiff's Exhibit. Would you please 
5
 | look that over and tell me what it is? 
A It's a note I wrote to Robert January 4th, 1980. 
Q And that's something you wrote? 
8
 I A It looks like it. And after I saw it in your 
9
 office, I couldn't understand why I did. I don't know. 
10
 MR. BERCEAU: At this time, Your Honor, I would 
11
 I offer into evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit P-8. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. McPhie? 
7 
12 
13
 MR. McPHIE: If I could look at that, again, 
14 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
for a second. I don't think I--no objection. 
15
 I THE COURT: It will be received. 
161
 (Whereupon, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8 was received 
17
 into evidence.) 
MR. BERCEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) I'm going to show you a group 
of letters, one is marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-ll. 
Could you please look.at that and tell me what it is? 
A It's just a note I wrote to Robert letting him 
23
 | know some of the things that were going on in the girls' 
lives. 
Q And that is a letter you sent to Robert? 
35 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q I'd like to show you what's been marked as P-12. 
3 Could you tell me what these are? Is that another letter 
4 that you sent to Robert? 
5 A It looks like two little notes that I've sent, 
6 just again letting him know that he could come for a visit, 
7 thanking him for the little things that he had sent to the 
8 girls and just little things that are going on in their 
9 lives. 
10 Q I'd like to show you what's been marked as 
n P-9. Could you please identify that for me and tell me 
12 if that's another letter you sent to Robert? 
13 A Just notes that we've sent to him in the Summer 
14 of '80. 
15 Q I show you No. P-10. Could you please look that 
16 over and see if that's a letter you sent to Robert? 
17 MR. McPHIE: Your Honor, objection, immaterial. 
18 If these don't contain something about the arrearage, I 
19 don't know what the value is. 
20 THE COURT: What do'you claim for it, Mr. Berceau^ 
21 MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, a lot of the letters 
22 do have content about receiving checks,"thank you for the 
23 check1'/ I think that's material. It's not — 
24 THE COURT: Why is that material,"thank you for 
25 the check"? 
36 
1
 MR, BERCEAU: Your Honor, our claim is to show 
2 estoppel and reliance. I think it's relevant and it goes 
3 along with a group of facts which will show to the Court 
4
 that there was an agreement for $120.00 per month. And 
5 then when the house was sold, he never had to pay her the 
6 amount of the house payment. And the letters are relevant. 
7 Some of them don't say anything, Your Honor, with regard 
8 to support, and their nonstatement is also relevant, 
9 relevance. Maybe weak, but it is relevant. And I will 
10 tie it all together with respect to closing argument. 
11 THE COURT: I have a hard time understanding 
12 how a letter doesn't say anything about it has any relevance 
13 one way or another. For what limited probative value they 
14 may have, they will be received, I guess. 
15 MR. BERCEAU: I just have a few more letters. 
16 THE COURT: I take it your only objection is 
17 materiality? 
18
 MR. McPHIE: Yeah. 
19 THE COURT: They will be received for whatever 
20 they are worth. 
21 MR. BERCEAU: Well, Your-Honor, may I show them 
22
 to Mr. McPhie and maybe we can stop this time, here and 
23 see if he has an objection. 
24 MR. McPHIE: Subject to the objection of 
25 materiality, no other objection. 
37 
THE COURT: They will be received. 
MR. BERCEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) You were divorced in 1979? 
A No. 
Q No? Okay. Well, let me ask you, then, with 
respect to the payment, according to that revised agreement 
of $120.00 in 1980, did he make those payments to you every 
month? 
A The escalated payments starting at 120? 
Q Yes, starting at 120? 
A Right. He's current on those payments. 
Q And then he escalated it in 1981 and paid you 
130? 
A Right. 
Q 1982, 140? 
A Yes. 
Q And then '83, 150? 
A Yes. 
Q '84, 160? 
A Yes. 
Q And now in '85, 170? 
A Yes. 
Q You've taken those checks and negotiated them 
all? 
A Yes, I have. 
38 
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M Q It's true that—excuse me, after you moved from 
2
 Colorado to Utah, is it true that you never talked to Robert 
3
 J about the $320.00 per month house payment being paid to 
you? 
5
 A There was that one time he had mentioned that 
6
 he saw an attorney. I think he brought it up once, and 
7
 he said he saw an attorney, and the attorney laughed at 
8
 the document and said he didn't know it, and basically let 
9
 me know that there was a fight he didn't agree with me on 
10 it. S o — 
11
 MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I have 
12
 the deposition. I move the Court open and move the 
13
 J publication. 
THE COURT: What is the deposition of and when 
is it? 
MR. BERCEAU: It's a deposition of Mrs. Moyes. 
17
 | THE COURT: Mrs. Moyes' deposition? 
MR. BERCEAU: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. McPhie? 
MR. McPHIE: No. 
THE COURT: It will be published. 
MR. BERCEAU: If the Court would excuse me a 
minute, while I take out a copy of it. I might have it 
24
 I with me. I know there's another one around. I do. 
25
 Q (By Mr. Berceau) I'd like to hand this depositiofi 
39 
1 here. I'd like you to turn to Page 37 of your deposition, 
2 please. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q I'd like to point you to the question No. 2 5 — 
5 excuse me, at Line 19. Can I read you the question? Would 
6 that be proper, Your Honor, and ask her? 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
3 I Q (By Mr. Berceau) The question is "When you met 
9 I for visitation purposes and this letter that's been marked 
10 deposition Exhibit No. 2 was typed and signed, do you recall 
H was there any discussion about whether that included or 
12 didn't include the money he had previously been paying as 
13 child support by making the house payment?11, and your answer 
14 was "There is no mention of the 320 ever mentioned in this, 
15 and he never said, "Now, you understand this means that 
16 I don't never said anything." 
17 The next question is--then it skips down.- I've 
18 slipped up, Your Honor. You had a question No. 3 on Page 
19 38. "Do you understand it to include the 320 a month 
20 amount?", and your answer was "No, not at all. After I 
2i moved, we never talked about the 320." 
22 With respect to your statement that you had a 
23 conversation with Robert in respect to this statement, that 
24 after I moved, we never talked about the 320, which is your 
25 memory, please? 
40 
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1
 A I'm sorry. What's—which do I remember? 
2
 Q Yeah, which would be your memory? This statement 
3| in the deposition or the one on the stand? 
A After giving the deposition, you know, you start 
5
 thinking about—I mean, six years is a long time to have 
6
 to remember things that happened, and I — 
7
 Q Okay. 
8
 I A —what I just said here in Court came to me after 
9
 I had given you the deposition. 
1° Q Okay. Is it true that you felt that since you 
U had the $13,000.00 in your back pocket, that that would 
12 due you for one, and you didn't need to talk about the 
13 I $320.00? 
A I don't believe in beating a dead horse. 
Q Is that what you said in your deposition? 
A I did say that. I said that would do me. Then, 
I went into how I didn't believe I didn't want to stay in 
Colorado and start a suit when I was registered to be in 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
25 
I9 s c h o o l . 
20 Q But you d id f e e l t h a t you had the 13,000 in your 
21 J back p o c k e t , and t h a t would do for you, and you d i d n ' t need 
2 2 1
 t o q u e s t i o n him about the $320 .00? I s t h a t t rue? 
23 I A Quest ion him about i t ? 
24 J Q Didn' t need t o ask him or d i s c u s s the $320 .00? 
A I knew i f I d i d , he wouldn' t g i v e i t t o me 
41 
1 Q Would that statement I just made, is that a 
2 statement you've made before, then, in your deposition? 
3 Could you look at No. 11? 
4
 A Oh, No. 11, I guess 1 felt I had 13,000 in my 
5 back pocket, and that would do me for one, meaning I didn't 
6 know-how far 13,000 or how fast 13,000 would go, trying 
7 to go to school. 
8 Q Thank you. With respect to Page 37, itfs true 
9 that before you moved to Utah, that Robert said he would 
10 pay you the $120.00 per month, isn't it? 
11 A Right. 
12 Q Is it true that you felt that at the time he 
13 said that because—so he didn't violate his separation and 
14 divorce agreement? 
15 A I felt that that was his way to keep his foot 
16 in the door without— 
t7 Q Could you just answer yes or no, please? 
18
 A Yes. 
19 Q And is it also true that in an effort to get 
20 on to Utah and get on your—with your education and life, 
21 you didn't feel you wanted to start a whole other Court 
22
 case and stay there and fight him, over what you'd have 
23 gotten out of him anyway if he was going to quit his job? 
24 A Right. 
25 Q so it is true that Robert proposed to pay you 
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1
 $120.00 child support upon your moving from Colorado to 
2
 Utah? 
3
 J A That—that's all he would pay, yes. 
4
 ' Q And it's also true that, then, that you didn't 
5
 make any comment regarding that? 
6
 I A I have no idea. 
Q And you wanted to? 
8
 I A Six years ago — 
9
 I Q You knew that Robert wanted the home as an 
investment, do you not? 
11
 J A Yes. Probably more so than having a nice home 
12
 for his children. 
13
 Q He did? 
14
 I A The money. 
Q He did provide that home for the children to 
live in in Colorado? 
17
 I A He did. 
Q And until you decided to sell it, they would 
have had the home to live in, isn't that true? 
A That's right. 
Q Okay. With respect to the investment, is it 
true that you have that, you received a deduction for inter-
23
 I est on that home every year from the I.R.S.? 
24
 I A I don't understand the question. 
Q With respect to that home, did you receive an 
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t interest deduction every year on that home from the I.R.S.? 
2 MR. McPHIE: Objection. 
3 THE WITNESS: I don't understand. 
4
 THE COURT: Sustained. 
5 MR. McPHIE: Immaterial. 
6 THE COURT: Sustained. 
7
 Q (By Mr. Berceau) What investment did Robert 
8 explain to you that he wanted to keep the home for? 
9 A Why did he want to keep the home? 
10 Q Yes. 
11 A For an investment. 
12 Q And did he say what that investment was? 
13 A Probably for tax purposes, I guess. I—I'm not 
14 mathematically minded, and understand all the tax. 
15 Q You agreed to give him the interest deduction, 
16 then, on the home? 
17 MR. McPHIE: Objection, immaterial. I don't 
18
 see what his interest in the home and the investment has 
19 to do with it. 
20 MR. BERCEAU: I think it's very material, Your 
21 J Honor. It's actually relevant, also. 
THE COURT: I suppose it goes to the estoppel 
23 I argument. Overruled. 
24
 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Could you tell me what I just 
25
 asked you? 
22 
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1
 THE COURT: If you know. Did he take the 
2 interest deduction or do you know? 
3
 I THE WITNESS: I imagine he did. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) And you agreed to give him 
5 the interest deduction? 
6
 A I guess. 
7
 Q Did you also agree to give him the property tax 
8 deduction? 
9
 A I guess. I don't understand all of this stuff. 
10 MR. BERCEAU: I don't have any other questions 
11 right now. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. McPhie, any more questions. 
13 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
14
 j BY MR. McPHIE: 
15 Q Was Robert employed when you were divorced? 
16
 A Yes, he was. 
i7
 Q Do you know where he was employed? 
18
 A Stone and Webber Engineering. 
19 Q Do you know what he was making? 
20 A I can't remember. It's on the separation agree-
21 J ment. I don't know if it's 1,800 a month. 
Q When the house was sold, do you remember what 
23 I it sold for? 
24 J
 A 1 think it was around 68,000. 
Q What happened to the loan that came from this 
45 
22 
25 
sale? How was that divided up? 
A The equity that was left after the loan was paid 
off, we split 50/50. 
Q Was that according to the decree? 
A There was nothing, as I recall, mentioned in 
the decree about the home. Like I say, when we were first 
divorced, I had no idea that I would be moving from Colorado 
and selling the home. I'm not sure if it's in there. 
Q Was the 50/50 split by private agreement between 
the two of you, then? 
A I guess. I'm sure it was. 
Q Did Mr. Blackburn understand, then, that his 
total child support obligation was four forty? 
MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor, as to what 
Mr. Blackburn understood is not--
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Did you have any discussion 
with Mr. Blackburn about the total child support obligation 
after the house was sold? 
MR. BERCEAU: Objection. The argument— 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Did you have any discussion 
with Mr. Blackburn after the house was sold about, you know, 
the 120 and the 320? 
A Well, he just basically told me that he had quit 
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1
 his job and he wouldn't pay me the 320 to make it easy for 
2 me to take his children out of the state and go to school. 
3
 J So basically, he told me he wasn't going to pay it. 
MR. McPHIE: No further questions. 
5
 MR. BERCEAU: I have a few questions. 
6
 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
7
 BY MR. BERCEAU; 
8 Q You moved out to Utah in August, 1979? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And you lived with your Mother? 
11
 A I did. 
*2 Q Did you pay her rent? 
13 A No, I didn't. 
14
 J MR. McPHIE: Objection, immaterial. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, with respect to support \ 
it's very material. You cannot go to the case law and get 
support if you never had it--put the money out in the first 
place or a third p a r t y — y o u can't collect something a third 
party obtained or had given you. 
20 I THE COURT: Sustained. 
21 Q (By Mr. Berceau) You did not pay your m o n e y — 
rent — 
23 THE COURT: The objection was sustained. 
24 J MR. BERCEAU: Oh, excuse me, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) How long did you live with 
47 
1 your Mother? 
2 A We lived together from that time in August of 
3 '79 until I was remarried in December of '82. 
4
 Q And your children resided there with you? 
5 A Yes, they did. 
6
 Q And Robert came out to visit you and stayed there 
7
 at times? 
8 A Right. 
9 Q And when you were married, then, you lived in 
10 Salt Lake? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And prior to living in Salt Lake with your 
13 current husband, you lived in Salt Lake with your Mother? 
14
 A Right. 
15 Q And when you moved to Utah, you lived with your 
1$ Mother? 
17
 A Right. 
18
 Q Down i n — 
19
 A Orem. 
20 Q —orem? 
21 J Your Honor, with respect to the objection as 
to questioning on to a line of who paid the rent, I'd like 
to request the Court—I can make a record after— 
22 
23 
25 
24
 THE COURT: You can make a record. I'm of the 
view it's immaterial, but you can make a proffer. 
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MR. BERCEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. McPHIE: I have no further questions. 
(Whereupon, further trial proceedings were had.) 
* * * 
March 6th, 1985 
MR. BERCEAU: I would like to call—I just have 
one question, I'd like to call an adverse party. Your Honor. 
I'd like to call Carol Moyes. I've got one question. I 
could ask her here while she's sitting down or take the 
stand. 
THE COURT: Why don't we have her take the stand. 
I found these one questions usually turn into more. 
MR. BERCEAU: Into two questions. 
THE COURT: If you will take the stand, Mrs. 
Moyes. For the record, you understand that you are still 
under oath? 
MRS. MOYES: Yes, I do. 
CAROL JEAN MOYES, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and testi-
fied as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BERCEAU: 
Q Mrs. Moyes, I'm trying to get a reference, when 
was Kristen born? 
^ ^ _ 19 | 
1 A I'm sorry, I didn't hear the question. 
2 Q When was Kristen born? 
3 A Born October 3rd, 1983. 
4
 MR. BERCEAU: No further questions. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. That was just one question, 
6
 Any cross-examination on that issue? 
7 MR. McPHIE: No. 
8 THE COURT: You may step down. 
9 (Whereupon, the testimony of Mrs. Moyes was 
10 I concluded.) 
11 
12 | * * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Susan S. Sprouse, hereby certify that I am 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah; that 
as such Certified Shorthand Reporter, I attended the 
hearing of the above-mentioned matter at that time and 
place set out herein; that thereat I took down in shorthand 
the testimony given and the proceedings had therein; and 
that thereafter I transcribed my said shorthand notes into 
typewriting, and that the foregoing transcription is a 
full, true, and correct transcription of the same, 
DATED this fH ^ day of November, 1985. 
Susan S. Sprouse% CSR/RPR 
My Commission Expires: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
* * * 
ROBERT FARRIS BLACKBURN, 
JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROL J. BLACKBURN MOYES, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C84-4490 
TESTIMONY OF TRIAL HEARD ON MARCH 6, 1985 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
DAVID J. BERCEAU, ESQ. 
Makoff, Okazaki & Berceau 
261 "ast 3CC South, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID A. IICPHIE, ESQ. 
Affleck & McPhie 
147 North Cecond West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Reported by: 
SUSAN S. SPROUSE, CSR/RP 
CO/V 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2I THE COURT: We'll continue in the case of Robert 
3 Farris Blackburn, Jr. verses Carol J. Blackburn Moyes, 
4 C84-4490. 
5J Let's see. I believe you were about ready to call 
g your first witness, Mr. Berceau. 
7J MR. BERCEAU: Yes, I was, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
9 | MR. BERCEAU: At this time I'd like to recall 
Mr. Blackburn to the stand. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blackburn, for the record you 
understand that you are still under oath? 
MR. BLACKBURN: Yes, Your Honor. 
14 | THE COURT: Thank you. 
R0r5?.T FA37.IS BLACXSURi;, JR. 
having previously been sworn to tell the truth, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
18 | DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BERCEAU: 
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Q Mr. Blackburn, did you become aware of your divorcje 
2t I in September 1978? 
A That's correct. Yes. 
Q And when did you first become aware of it? 
A Carol told me that she was — she obtained a lawye| 
to file for a divorce. 
Q Did you leave the house after that, sir? 
1 A Not until October of '70. 
2 Q And September did you have any discussions with hei| 
3 whatsoever regarding the terms of your divorce? 
4
 A Yes, We sat down at that time. 
6 Q And where sir? 
6 A That was in our house at the dining room table 
7 and went over what we were going to do. I asked what she 
8 wanted to do, and we discussed — 
9 Q What did you discuss, sir? 
10 A We discussed custody and visitation and keeping 
11 the house anc Carol staying in the house and kind of how 
12 we were going to divide some of the property and so forth. 
13 Q What custody — you've agreed to give her custody? 
14 A Well, I said that I would want to get custody or 
15 get joint custody. I admitted it would be a useless waste o 
16 time for me to try and get it. I went ahead and said 
17 she could have custody of the kids. 
18 Q Did you have any discussions regarding your home 
19 in September/ sir? 
20 A Yes. We agreed that we would keep the home and 
21 that way we'd be able to preserve the seven and a half low 
22 interest loan. And also that the children would be able 
23 to stay in the family home# and that we wouldn't have to pay 
24 capital gains, taxes by selling it# the house at that time. 
25 Q Did you discuss support at that time/ sir? 
1 MR. MCPHIE: I'm going to object, Your Honor. j 
2 Rather than clearly state, what my objection is a line of 
3 questioning concerning the discussions and the negotiations 
* that led to the separation agreement and the decree go 
5 behind it. I think we have to look at the decree and that's 
6 all we should be looking at. I think the discussions and j 
7 agreements are merged into that, have barred this kind of j 
8 discussion, is barred by — 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. For the record the 
10 objection is overruled. 
11 MR. BERCEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Did you have any discussions 
13 regarding support in September and if so could you tell me 
14 what was discussed between you two? 
15 A Well, we agreed the kids would stay in the house 
16 and I would pay for the house. 
17 Q Did you come up with any amount of money that you 
18 would pay her? Did you talk about anything? 
19 I A I don't think we really started talking about 
20 money at that time. 
21 Q Okay. 
22 A In September. 
23 Q Did you talk about money later, sir? 
24 A Yeah. Later in October and November we talked abo 
25 money. 
1 Q Let me ask you, sir, did you obtain an attorney? 
2 A Pardon? 
3 Q Did you obtain an attorney? 
4 A No, I didn't. In October I went to see Carol's 
5 attorney just to find out what was happening. That's before 
6 the paperwork had been started or anything. 
7 Q And what was his name, sir? 
8 A Kent Stewart. 
9 Q Did he say anything to you, if anything, sir? 
10 A Yes. He said since Carol and I already agreed on 
n what we were going to do and everything, we had stuff 
12 pretty well figured out how we were going to divide the 
13 property, I didn't need an attorney and would write down 
14 what Carol and I agreed to in the separation agreement. 
15 Q Now, you alluded to a conversation in October. 
16 Did you have further discussions with Carol in October, sir? 
17 A Yes. We talked again about most of the items and 
18 about — 
19 Q With respect to support, did you get more precise 
20 with respect to dollar amounts in October? 
21 A Well, yes. We started batting around a number of 
22 50 to $100 that I would pay in addition to the house payment 
23 and the reason was is because we started talking about that 
24 I would take the deduction for the kids. And so then she 
25 said I should pay some more in addition to the house. So 
1 we started batting around a number of 50 or a $100 in 
2 addition to the house payment. 
3 Q Who batted around 50# sir? 
4
 A Well, I was going for the lower amount, of course,] 
5 of $50 or something like that. And she was going for $100 
6 or something like that. 
7 Q Did you talk about the home any more, sir? 
8 A Yes. We said that we would keep the home and the 
9 kids would live in the home, and I would pay the mortgage 
10 payment and that I would take the tax deductions for that 
11 for the house, for the interest, the mortgage interest, 
12 and the property taxes. 
13 Q And did you in your opinion agree to that, sir? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Did you have any discussions in November regarding 
16 further the topic of support or your home, sir? 
17 A Well, yes. Now, in October we hadn't really got 
18 into — she hadn't got into detail with her lawyer. Well, 
19 in November we had already started working on financial 
20 affidavits and so forth, so we came back and talked some mor£, 
21 sitting down at the dining room table going over what we 
22 were going to do. And I remember Carol saying, "Well, you 
23 got down $50 for recreation and this financial affidavit 
24 and I should have that. So therefore, I need more money to! 
25 make my amounts balance out.'1 We were trying to balance out 
1 what she was earning as a secretary and what she would need [to 
2 make her financial affidavit come out. And then that's 
3 why we pushed it up to a 120, kind of set the 120 amount 
4 to balance out those financial affidavits that we were worki|ng 
5 on. 
6 Q Was it your idea of a 120, sir? 
7 A Well, no. But she was pushing for more. 
8 I Q So is it your opinion that you agreed upon a 120 
9 at that time, sir? 
10 A Yes. We agreed at that time to set the amount 
H at a 120. 
12 Q With respect to the home, did you have any further] 
13 discussions with the home in November? 
14 A Yeah. I went over again about keeping the home fcjj 
15 a long time and let's see what else went on. 
16 Q The home ever get repaired, sir? Who did the re-
17 pairs? 
18 A Oh, yeah. After I moved out in October and Carol 
19 had been in the home by herself with the kids for about 
20 a month she said that she was going to need help with 
2i maintenance on the house and so forth. So in November 
22 we agreed that we would — we would both pay one half the 
23 maintenance cost and I would help her with maintaining the 
24 home, doing repairs and so forth on the home. 
25 Q And you did make some repairs on the home? 
1 A Yes, I did make repairs like fixing faucets and 
2 the garage door opener and things like that. And I paid 
3 half of it and she paid half. 
4 MR. BERCEAU: I think we1re missing some letters, 
5 THE COURT: Is the separation agreement there? 
6 I MR. BERCEAU: I don't need it, Your Honor. I 
7 can talk about it. 
8 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Did you sign a separation 
9 agreement, sir? 
A Well, her attorney wrote up the separation agreeme| 
and then out in the hall before going into court — 
MR. MCPHIE: Objection, Your Honor. He needs to 
answer the question. 
14 | THE COURT: Sustained. Just answer the question, 
please. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, I did sign the agreement. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) When? 
18 | A Outside the court room before going into court. 
Q Thank you. The separation agreement, sir, that 
has been in court yesterday, is that the one you signed, 
sir? 
A Yes, I believe that's the one, if it was what was 
shown. I didn't really remember seeing it. 
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24 MR. MCPHIE: Do you want a copy of it? 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Would you please look at this, 
sir, is this the separation agreement? 
A Yes. This the separation agreement. 
Q You've seen it numerous times? 
A Yes. 
Q You were divorced in September, sir? 
A Yes. 
Q What year? 
A Pardon? 
Q In what year, sir? 
A 1978. 
Q Between the time of your separation up till your 
divorce, had you been making the house payment of $120 
a month? 
A The house payment is 320. 
Q 320? Excuse me. And you were making that 
monthly mortgage? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And that included taxes and insurance? 
A Yeah. Principal, interest, taxes and insurance. 
Q Let me ask you about the home. Where was it? 
A It was in Littleton, Colorado, suburb south 
of Denver. 
Q Could you describe it for me? 
A It was a two-bedroom ranch home with attached 
garage and a basement. 
9 
4 
' I Q And was the basement fixed up or was it — 
2
 A We had it partially finished basement with an extr|a 
3
 I bedroom downstairs. 
Q Can you recall the financing on the home and what 
5I was it, sir? 
8
 A We had a $35r000 mortgage at 7% percent. 
7
 Q And that was through Mel1in Mortgage? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Can you recall how much interest deduction you 
10 were getting? 
11 A It was over $2,000, about 2,600, I believe. 
12 Q A year? 
13 A Yes. 
H Q You were paying property taxes? 
15 A Yes. 
18
 Q Were you taking that deduction, sir? 
17 A Yes. That was about $600 a year, a little more. 
18
 Q Who desired to sell the home, sir? 
19 A Well, first neither one of us were going to sell 
20 it. We were going to keep it for a long time. Then in 
21 April of 1979, Carol approached me saying she wanted to sell] 
22
 the house. 
23 Q And what was your response to her, if any? 
24 A I was opposed to selling the house. 
25 Q And did you tell her why? 
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A Yes, because I would — I had a number of advant^ 
ages and benefits that I gained by keeping the house, and I 
told her those benefits and said that I didn't want to sell 
the house. I wanted to keep getting those benefits. 
Q What were those benefits you told her, sir? 
A The deductions for the mortgage, interest, and 
the deduction for the property taxes and also high inflatio 
on the house itself. It was continuing to appreciate in 
value and also maintaining the low interest loan on the 
house and also having a home for the children to live in an 
be near me in Denver. 
Q Did you ever find out why Carol wanted to sell 
the home? 
A Yes. She said — 
MR. MCPHIE: Objection. Why she wanted to sell 
the home, there's no foundation and it's immaterial. 
THE COURT: Overruled —or sustained on the 
basis of foundation. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) At that time, sir, did Carol 
make any statements to you? 
A Yes. She said she wanted to sell the home to go 
THE COURT: Just answer the question for right 
now. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: That can be answered yes or no. 
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THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) What did she say? 
A She said she wanted to sell the home to go to 
BYU to finish her interior design degree so she could get 
6 a better job as an interior designer. That she didn't want 
6 to be a secretary for the rest of her life. And she said 
7 that quote, "I don't want to be a burden on you", unquote. 
8 Q Did she — d i d you make any statements to her in 
9 regards to the home? 
10 A Yeah. I told her I didn't. 
11 Q What did you say? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q What did you say? 
14 A Well, I told her I didn't want to sell the home 
15 because I'd lose those benefits. And she said I would just 
16 have to pay her 120 and I wouldn't have to pay the 320 any 
17 more. 
18 Q Did you ever have any discussions about local 
19 college, if any? 
20 A Yes. At that time I tried to talk her out of 
21 selling the house. I said, "Why don't you go to Rapahoe 
22 College", which is in Littleton where we lived. She said 
23 she didn't want to do that. A lot of her grades from 
24 BYU wouldn't change. 
25 Q Did you make any alternatives of suggestions, if 
12 
1 any, keeping the home? 
2 A Yes, I suggested that we rent out the house 
3I and I would stay there and manage it, and then send her one 
4
 half of the profits or I suggested — I also suggested that 
5I I stay in the house with the children so they wouldn't 
6 have to leave their family home that they were accustomed 
7 to living• And then after she finished her degree, 
8 she could come back and live in the house again. 
9 I Q Sir, did she tell you, if any, where she was going 
10 in Utah? 
11 A I 'm sorry. 
12 Q Did she tell you at all where she was going in 
13 Utah? 
14 A Well, she said she was going to BYU to go to schoc| 
15 She saidgoing to live with her mother. I asked her — 
16 MR. MCPHIE: Objection. He's going beyond the 
17 question asked. 
18 THE COURT: Sustained. 
19 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Did she make any statements to 
20 you where she was going to reside, sir? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q What did she say? 
23 MR. MCPHIE: Objection, immaterial. 
24 THE COURT: Ifm sorry. What was the question 
25 again? 
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MR. BERCEAU: I asked him, Your Honor, if she made! 
any statements regardina the subject of where she was going 
to live in Utah and he said, yes. And I asked him what 
then, Your Honor, what was said. 
THE COURT: Well, what do you claim for that? 
MR. BERCEAU: Well, I want to — I think it's 
relevant that where she was going to live after she moved 
out of the home, I think. 
THE COURT: What's that? 
MR. BERCEAU: The topic is that she had a place 
to go, Your Honor. 
MR. MCPHIE: How does where she have a place -to go] 
to — 
THE COURT: I have a hard time understanding 
that, too. 
MR. BERCEAU: I believe it is probative, Your Honojr 
It tends to point towards whether there was estoppel or not 
And I think it is a fact, and I don't think there's any harm! 
to it being entered. 
THE COURT: I think that's probably right. I 
can't see much prejudicial effect; although, I see very 
little probative value. But neverless, the objection will 
be overruled. He can answer. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Do I need to rephrase the 
question? 
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A 
Q 
Utah? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. What was the question, again? 
Did she tell you where she was going to live in 
Yes. 
What did she say, sir? 
She said she was going to live in Utah with her 
mother and — 
Q Okay. Thank you. These discussions that you've 
had at the time she decided to sell the home regarding suppd 
and the 
and her 
benefits that you explained to her, how long did you 
continue to discuss the sale of the home, sir, over 
what period of time? 
A 
and July 
house. 
Q 
knowledg 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Well, we had discussions in April, May, June, 
', all the time that we were trying to sell the 
Was there ever a listing on the home to your 
e? 
Yes. 
And who obtained that, sir? 
Carol. 
Did you ever sell the home? 
Yes. We did sell the home. 
Do you know when you had a buyer? 
Not till late June really or mid June. 
Did you have any discussions regarding the price 
1 5 J 
rt 
1 of the home? 
2 I A Yes. Initially Carol met with the realtor, and 
3 they set the price of the home and she signed the listing 
* contract which I did not sign. And I thought the price for 
5 the home was set too low but later w e — I went ahead and 
6 signed another, a second listing contract which both Carol 
7 and I signed with the realtor, and we went ahead and stayed 
8 with that original price that the realtor had said. 
9I Q Did you obtain that price, sir? 
10 A Yes. We did. We obtained that price. 
11 Q Did you have any further discussions regarding thajt 
12 price after the listing agreement was signed with Carol, sir] 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And can you recall? 
15 A I remember in June after we had not been able to 
16I sell the house for a couple of months, Carol said we were 
17 going to have to take a lower price for the house and 
18 also pay points. And I said that I wasn't willing to do thajt 
19 I was glad because I thought maybe that would stop the 
20 sale of the house, actually. 
21 Q Sir, did you have any discussions with Carol 
22 regarding the amount of money that she wanted you to pay 
23 her after the home was sold for support? 
24 A Yes. Originally, she had said that I would only 
25 have to pay 120. Then in May, she came back and suggested 
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1 maybe it should be a little bit more. I said nor it would 
2 be 120 like you said. And then I asked her, I reminded 
3 her that the house was supposed to be a home for the kids. 
4 And again I asked her about how she was going to provide thaj: 
. And she said she's going to live with her mother while she's 
6 going to school and after she graduates, she would have 
7 extra income and be able to buy a house for the kids. And* 
I was going to pay 120. And the reason I asked her that 
9 because I wasn't going to be paying the 320, and that's why 
I wanted to be — make sure she was providing a home for 
the kids without the 320. 
Q Did you ever go to court, sir, regarding that-? 
A No. In, in June at about the time the house 
was getting ready to be sold,at first it wasn't going to be 
sold. Then the same buyers came back again and Carol told 
that we could sell the house at the same price, but 
we'd have to pay points. And I agreed to go ahead and pay 
points. And then at that time it looked like the house was 
going to be held—as a matter of feet I can remember the 
conversation I was in the backyard rrfter the buyers were 
coming over to look at the house for a second time, and 
23 
24 
22 we actually met them and I couldn't shake hands with them. 
had dirty hands form gardening work and stuff. At that time) 
I suggested to Carol we go to court and go ahead and get 
25 I this rapped up and finalized and everything. And she said 
17 
10 
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t no, she didn't want to go to court because she was in a 
2 hurry to go back to school. She was the one pushing for thd 
3 house and pushing in a hurry to get the house sold ina hurr}] 
4 so she could get back to start school in September. 
s Q Did you have any discussions at that time 
6 regarding insurance, sir, if any? 
7 THE COURT: Excuse me, regarding what? 
8 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Regarding insurance. 
g A In July after we had already signed the 
agreement to sell the house but before the closing, we were 
both looking forward to the kids being the move to Utah 
and so forth. And I was looking forward to what I would be 
doing. And I told Carol I'd be having a problem getting 
14 insurance and handling insurance for the kids when they 
15 
16 
18 
19 
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are out of state and I'm still in Colorado. And 
Carol said she would buy the insurance, family insurance 
t7 and I could pay her the difference for the kids portion of 
that insurance. 
Q And did you pay her, sir? 
A That's correct. She bought the insurance at BYU 
and I paid her for the children's portion of that insurance.) 
Q Then in August 1979 they moved to Salt Lake? 
A Yeah. The iiouse was closed on, I believe, August 
JL, and then she moved right away to Utah. 
Q She didn't move to Salt Lake. It was to Orem? 
18 
1 A It was to Orem, Utah, yes, 
2 Q And then in November 1980 did you sign a revised 
3 agreement with her, sir? 
4
 A Yes. 
5 Q Is the revised agreement up there, Your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: Yes, I got that. 
7 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Does your signature appear on 
8 there, sir? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Between August 1979 and November 13, 1980 the dat^ 
11 of this agreement, how much support had you been paying 
12 Carol per month? 
13 A $120 per month. 
14 Q And you also reimbursed her for the difference 
15 in the insurance? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q During that time, did she ever demand of you $320 
18 per month? 
19 A No, not once. 
20 Q Had you previously discussed the $320 a month witty 
21 her? 
22 A I'm sorry? 
23 Q Strike that. Would you take a look at that a minute. 
24 In November of '80, did you go stay for a week in Orem? 
26 A Yes, to visit the children. 
Q And you stayed at the home of Carol's mother? 
19 
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1 i A Yes. 
2 I Q Was i t at c m s res idence that t h i s agreement was 
3 negotiated? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Could you tell me the circumstance surrounding 
e I the drawing up of this agreement, sir? 
7 A Well# when I got over to Utah, Carol told me 
8 that she was working atConantSt Associates and that after she 
g graduated she was going to move to Salt Lake City and work 
atCcnant&Associates full time, and that she wouldn't be 
returning to Colorado. And I told her that I thought she hid 
said she would return to Colorado. And she said that she -4 
she said and I quote, "Well, I never really — I never 
14 realy planned to return to Colorado." I remember the 
phrase she said, "Well, I didn't really plan to return any-
way." And the thing is it was kind of almost a devious griijt 
or snide remark the way she said it. 
18 | MR. MCPHIE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. ^ Berceau) Now, with respect to your belief 
that she was going to go back to Colorado, had she ever 
22 made any statements to you to that effect? 
A Yeah, back at the time we were talking about selling 
24 the home back in April and May, I asked her would she be 
returning to Colorado, and she said, "Well, I probably will 
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as if it was a foregone conclusion, obviously she would be 
returning to Colorado and she'd always — 
Q Can I stop you? Nowwith, I'd like to take you 
back to November of '80 when you were at her home. Now 
with respect to her statement; after her statement that she 
wasn't coming back to Utah, what did you do, if anythjLng, 
sir? 
A Well, then I thought that she was renegging on 
the agreements and stuff — 
MR. MCPHIE: Objection. He asked what he did. 
He's telling what he thought. 
THE WITNESS: Would you restate — 
THE COURT: Restate the question, ask him what was| 
said, really. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) What did you say to Carol, sir? 
A Regarding her not returning to Colorado? 
Q Regarding this agreement, sir. 
A I said that we should write down our agreements 
that we made at the time of the house sale. 
Q And what did you then do, sir? 
A I suggested that we both write up a preliminary 
agreement, and then we should negotiate what we'd write 
down, using those preliminary agreements. 
Q Did you write up a preliminary agreement? 
A Yes, I did. 
21 
t Q Did Carol? 
2 A No, she did not. 
3 Q With respect to that revised agreement that you 
4 have in your hand, do you have this regarding who typed it? 
5 A Carol typed it, I believe. 
5 Q Were you present when it was typed, sir? 
7 A No, I was not. 
8 Q When did you give her your proposed agreement? 
g Do you know what day it was? 
A It was on Tuesday. We had the discussions about 
not returning to Colorado on Monday, and then — 
MR. MCPHIE: Objection. The question has been 
answered. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14I THE COURT: Sustained, 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Okay. After your discussion on 
Monday and your handing her the proposal on Tuesday, when 
did you first see this revised agreement, sir? 
A On Thursday evening. 
<f And describe how you came to see it. 
A She handed it to me. 
Q Did you look it over, sir? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you make any comments to her, if anything, 
about the content? 
A Yes. I noticed there was some. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
22 
- Q What did you say, then, sir? 
2j A I saidf "What's this stuff about increasing the 
3I 120?" 
4 J Q And do you recall if she made any statement to 
. , you and could you tell the court what it was? 
6 I A Yes. She said that's all you're going to get. 
j That's the agreement and take it or leave it. 
Q Did you ever get a copy of that agreement, sir? 
A Yes. We signed it that Thursday evening. Then 
Carol took it back and I got xerox copies the next day. 
Q Did you agree, sir, to give her a ten dollar 
increase in 1981 — would that be correct — over your -
120 dollar support? 
A Reluctantly, yes. 
Q With respect to 1982, did you agree to increase 
that again? 
A Well, we agreed at the time this was written to 
make those yearly, increases of ten dollars each year. 
Q At whose suggestions, sir? 
A Carol — well, it was just written here. It 
wasn't suggestion. It was just written here and handed 
22 I to me, finished. 
Q With respect to number 2 on there, sir, it 
mentions travel expenses. Whose idea was travel expenses, 
sir? 
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1 MR. MCPHIE: Objection, Your Honor. The issue of 
2 travel expenses isn't before the court. 
3 THE COURT: What do you claim for that, Mr. Berce 
* MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, with respect to the 
5 negotiations and the discussions surrounding this agreement 
6 and their discussions and stuff in 1979 at the time of the 
7 sale of the home, it shows an active participation by 
8 both parties in ongoing comments and statements which is 
9 I abase of our estoppel waiver and acquiescence of our claim. 
10 THE COURT: I suppose it may have some bearing. 
11 Overruled. 
12 Q (By Mr. Berceau) Whose suggestion was travel 
13 expenses, sir? 
14I A I'm not really sure. 
15 Q With respect to the I.R.S. paragraph three, you 
16 take the deductions and the I.R.S. regulations referred to 
17 there, whose suggestion was that, do you know, sir? 
18 I A Well, I think these are pretty much my suggestions 
19 that I wrote up on my preliminary notes that I gave to 
20 her. 
21 Q I'd like to show you some documents, sir. I'd 
22 like to show you what's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
23 P-7. Could you look those documents over, sir, pleaseidenti 
24 I ttjem? CouH you tell the court what those are? 
25 A These are my handwritten original notes that I 
24 
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prepared on Tuesday at Carol's mother's home in November 
that I was going to give to Carol to work out an agreement 
Q Okay. Are those your preliminary proposals 
part of this revised agreement? 
A Well, yeah. This is preliminary. Then I recopiecj 
this. This is all copied of, sketched out of the order. 
I recopied this and gave her a recopied handwritteh copy 
that I gave to her that she used to make up the final copy. 
Q Now, with respect to this, have you kept this 
as part of your records, your divorce, sir? 
A Yes, just in the file in my divorce papers and 
so forth. 
Q And this is a true and accurate record that you 
kept? 
A Yes. 
Q And is this also a recordization of your memory 
at the time of your proposals? 
A Yes. This is my proposal that I'm making, yes. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I would 
offer into evidence Exhibit P-7. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. McPhie? 
MR. MCPHIE: No. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
(Whereupon Exhibt P-7 
was received into evidence.) 
25 
1
 Q (Bv Mr. Berceau) Thank you, Your Honor. 
2
 I'd like to show you, sir, Exhibit P-5. Could you 
3 please identify that? 
4
 A Now, this is back at the time of the house sale. 
5 Q And what is it, sir? 
6
 A This is a document that I wrote up listing my 
7 benefits for the house that I was getting by maintaining 
8 ownership in the house. 
9 Q And you madethat record, sir? When? 
10 A I made that in July 1979 showing that I earned 
11 over $400 worth of benefits by keeping the house. 
12 Q $400 of benefits, when, sir? 
13 A $400 per month or more than $400 per month 
14 that I benefitted by my keeping the house. 
15 Q And you made this document up, sir? 
16 A Yes. I made that up, sir, in July, '79. 
17 Q And did you make this up from your memory of what 
18 you had stated to Carol during the time of the house sale? 
19 A Yes. I told this information to Carol a number of| 
20 times in attempting to convince her not to sell the house. 
21 Q Is this a record that you've kept as part of your 
22 divorce documents, sir? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And it was made and written on June 24th, 1979, 
25 sir? 
26 
1 A Yes. 
2 MR. MCPHIE: No objection if it's offered 
3 as being illustrative of the testimony only. 
4 THE COURT: It will be received for that purpose. 
5 MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, we're also offering it 
6 as a record of his divorce that he's kept. 
7 THE COURT: Well, but he didn't keep it 
8 contemporaneously? 
9 I MR. BERCEAU: Yes, he did# June 24th, 1979. It's 
10 also recorded memory and I think it goes in for more than ju^ 
11 illustrative purposes. 
12 THE COURT: Well, let me see the document* 
13 MR. MCPHIE: Your Honor, I don't object to it 
14 being a record of his own perception of it written down 
15 contemporaneously, and being illustrative of his present 
16 testimony, but as being accurate the actual amount to be 
17 saved, I object to it. 
18 THE COURT: Yes. That's probably right. It will 
19 be received as his testimony, a record of his understanding 
20 at the time. 
21 MR. BERCEAU: And he's also testified as to what 
22 he told her, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Right. It won't be received as for — 
24 MR. BERCEAU: The absolute truth asserted. 
25 THE COURT: And approved. 
27 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Thank you, Your Honor. 
Sir, I'd like to show you what's been marked 
3I as Exhibit P-14. Could you please look through that and 
4 identify it for the court? 
5 A These are all my support checks from 1979 through 
6I 1974, plus my checks to things like the children's dentist 
7 and the children's doctors and the other payments for t*he 
8 children and also auxiliary payments to Carol for various 
9 items. 
0 Q And you put that together, sir? 
, A Yes. I put this together a couple of weeks ago 
2 at your request. 
3 Q And are these — does this contain your checks, 
4I then, from 1979, sir, that you paid to Carol? 
Yes. 
And 1980 that you paid to Carol? 
Yes. 
1982 that you paid to Carol? 
Yes. 
1983 that you paid to Carol? 
Yes. 
1984 that's paid to Carol? 
Yes. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I offer 
into evidence Exhibit P-14. 
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1 MR. MCPHIE: Your Honor, I don't think it's materi) 
2 but because they are so nicely done, I have no objection. 
3 THE COURT: They will be received. 
* I (Whereupon Exhibit P-14 
was received into evidence.)] 
6 " 
-I MR. BERCEAU: With respect to not material, I thirj 
they are the best evidence. 
MR. MCPHIE: I might mention that the issue of 
whether he's current in those things has been admitted prior 
THE COURT: That's true. 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) I'd like to show you, sir, Exhibit 
P-15. Could you tell me what that says? 
A Okay. This is a list of those checks with also 
description of the checks. 
Q Is that a summary that you've made from those 
checks as to what the checks went for, sir? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you made that from your memory, sir? 
A Well, looking at the checks at my checking and 
also at letters and so forth that related to the various 
checks. 
Q Okay. Is this a true and accurate summary in youij 
opinion of where the checks went to, sir? 
A Yes. 
24 
,_ I Q And you made a summary for 1979? 
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Yes. 
Made a summary for 1980? 
Yes. 
Made a summary for 1981? 
Yes. 
And a summary for 1982? 
Yes. 
1983, sir? 
Yes. 
And 1984? 
Yes. 
And 1985, sir? 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, at this time I offer 
into evidence the Exhibit/D-15 as a summary. 
MR. MCPHIE: No objection. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
(Whereuoon, Exhibit P-15 
was received into eviden] 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) Mr. Blackburn, I'd like to show 
ou Exhibit P-16. Could you please identify that for me? 
A Okay. These are my checks that I wrote to Charlejs 
rown for his services. 
MR. BERCEAU: I'd offer P-16 into evidence. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. MCPHIE: The issue isn't what he said to 
be) 
1 Mr, Charles Brown, but the reasonableness of the fee. We 
2 don't have Mr. Brown here to testify about it. I don't 
3 think it's material. 
4
 THE COURT: Well, the appropriate way to determin^ 
5 reasonable fee is to have the attorney testify, that's true 
6 I suppose it does have some bearing. It will be received. 
* (Whereupon Exhibit P-16 was 
I received into evidence. 
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MR. BERCEAU: I don't have any further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. McPhie. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCPHIE; 
Q Mr. Blackburn, let me show you what's been marked 
Defendant's Exhibit 19. You may have already identified 
this as a Plaintiff's Exhibit, I'm not sure, but let me show 
it to you. Do you recognize that? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q What is it? 
A These are the financial affidavits that we drew 
up at the time of the divorce, just preceding the time of 
the divorce. 
Q What's the top sheet? What's it? 
A Oh, this is the decree of the divorce. 
Q That's the actual decree? 
A Yes, I believe it is. 
Q Is that document separate from the settlement 
31 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
agreement' 
documents 
? 
MR. 
speak 
THE 
objectionable. 
BERCEAU: 
> for 
Objection 
themselves as 
COURT: 
The que 
, Your Honor. Those 
to their 
I'm not so sure that 
jstion is is that a i 
incorporation. 
question is 
separate — 
MR. MCPHIE: Is it separate from the settlement 
agreement? 
THE COURT: He can say what his understanding is 
about that. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I never saw this until a coup]] 
of weeks after the divorce when Carol's lawyer mailed this tq 
me. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) Did you see it at that time? 
A Two weeks after the divorce? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q Did you read it then? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you understand it? 
A I'm not sure. 
Q Is there any portion of it as you look at it now 
that you don't understand? 
A Yes. 
Q What portion is that, the — 
A The part on the back that says $440 per month, I 
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never talked about $440 a month. We always talked about 
$120 a month. 
2 
3| Q I want to know what part you didn't understand 
4 MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. He asked thaj 
_ question. I believe he's entitled to explain. 
THE COURT: I believe he answered. 
THE WITNESS: I didn't understand the 440. We 
always talked about 120 and 320. 
9I Q (By Mr. McPhie) Thank you. Let me show you what' 
been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 20 and I think, again, 
you've already seen this as one of your own exhibits. Do 
you recognize that? 
A Okay. This is a letter from you to me in November 
1983. And I received this letter some point after November 
9th, 1983 or in Novebmer 1983. 
Q Now, November of '83 was how long before you came 
to Utah? 
A Let's see, about four, five months, that would be —} 
yeah, maybe six months, till May, about six months. 
Q That letter demanded of you that you pay the 
arreages on the 320? 
MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor, as to what 
is stated in the letter. 
THE COURT: Well, don't characterize what it says, 
just ask him the question. 
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1 0 (By Mr. McPhie) Did you respond to the letter? 
2 A No, I did not. 
3 Q What did you do? Did you do anything with regard 
4
 to the letter after you got it? 
5 A No. I don't recall that I did. At that time, 
6 I was unemployed, and I was getting ready to move out of my 
7 apartment because I didn't have any money to pay my" rent. 
8 Q Thank you. Although, I don't know, I don't know 
9 whether you've actually said this or not, Mr. Blackburn, 
10 did you expect that the only portion of the decree or the 
11 separation agreement on child support that was enforceable 
12 against you was the $120 portion? 
13 MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. It calls foif 
14 a legal conclusion. 
15 MR. MCPHIE: No, I'm asking what he expected. 
16 THE COURT: He asked him his understanding. 
17 Overruled, he can answer. 
18 THE WITNESS: What I expected I would pay 120 and 
19 then I would also pay for the house, 320 for the next 15 
20 years. And then we'd sell the house and divide it 50/50. 
21 Q (By Mr. McPhie) Did you expect that if your wife 
22 sold the house, your child support obligation dropped to 
23 a 120 a month? 
24 MR. BERCEAU: Objection, Your Honor. That has 
25 another legal conclusion as to what the child support was. 
34 
1 I think that's the issue in this case. 
2 MR. MCPHIE: It doesn't call for a legal conclusid 
3 THE COURT: Overruled. He can answer what his 
4 explanation was. 
5 I THE WITNESS: Would you restate the question? 
• Q (By Mr. McPhie) Did you expect if the house was 
7 sold, your child support obligation dropped to $120 a month? 
8I A Well, before Carol mentioned — 
9 1 Q Just did you expect? 
10 THE COURT: He's trying to answer the question, 
11 I beleive, Mr. McPhie. 
12 THE WITNESS: Before Carol mentioned selling 
13 the house, I didn't expect that I would ever not be paying 
14 the 320 for the house. 
15 Q (By Mr. McPhie) So you expected you'd for 15 
16 years, you'd be paying 320 and 120? 
17 A That's correct. 
18 Q And did you expect that the children would continue) 
19 to live in that house during those 15 years? 
20 A Yes, I did. 
21 Q In your considerations surrounding the settlement 
22 agreement in this divorce, did it ever — did you consider 
23 the possibility that your wife might remarry? 
24 A I never really added it into any consideration. 
25 Q Would it be true to say then, you had no 
35 
n, 
1 expectation as to what would happen with regard to child support 
2 if she remarried? 
3 A I would say that I didn't think about it. 
4
 Q Let me show you an exhibit that you previously 
5 I identified, and I'm sorry, Your Honor, I've got the copy 
6 Mr. Berceau gave me, but I don't know which — it's this 
7 one. I don't know which number it is, though. 
8 I MR. BERCEAU: It's the red one, Your Honor. 
9 I THE COURT: That's ~ for the record, that's 
10 Exhibit P-5. 
11 Q (By Mr. McPhie) Let me show you a copy of what's 
12 marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5. Is that your hand made 
13 record of the money you expected to save on taxes by 
14 making the house payment? 
15 A This is what I thought my benefits were by 
16 continuing it, yes. 
17 Q Okay. You show here that you show here that you 
18 expected the house to increase in value at the rate of 
19 ten percent per year; is that correct? 
20 A That's at that time my conservative. 
21 Q Market inflation, you expected it to increase 
22 ten percent per year? 
23 A At the time it had been increasing far more than 
24 ten percent. 
25 Q Was that your assumption? 
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A That's my averaged out assumption, it would be 
averaged out. 
Q Better increased on that amount? 
4 I A For that amount, yeah. Later it would be higher 
amount for the house and maybe a different inflation number 
and still come out to be the same amount, even with different} 
inflation numbers. 
Q But your assumption that youfd save $408 a month, 
that is over $3,600 a year based on the idea that over 15 
years that house would appreciate at ten percent per year, 
correct? 
A It's based on the benefits that I had received 
in actuality at the time from the time that we got divorced 
until the time we sold the house. In other words, I had beer) 
receiving benefits more than that. At the time I thought they 
were 600 accruing at $600 a month for myself. 
Q Let me ask you the question again. Ifd like to -
just answer the question I'm asking you. This Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 5 shows that you expect to save $408 a month. 
That's based on the assumption that that house would increase] 
in value due to inflation at 10 percent per year, correct? 
A An average of ten percent a year. 
Q Thank you. Let me show you what's been marked 
Defendant's Exhibit 18. It's also Plaintiff's Exhibit. For 
the court it is the revised child support agreement document 
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which is five paragraphs in length and bears both their 
signatures. Do you recall a discussion at the time this 
document was signed to the effect that she wanted an increas^ 
in the $120 amount for purposes of adjusting for inflation? 
A There was no discussion. She handed me the finished 
6 I copy. I wanted her to give me trough draft. 
7 Q Do you recall any — you don't recall such a 
8 discussion? 
9 1 A I recall after she handed me the finished document!, 
10 then I said that I was opposed to that and — or I said, 
ti I "What is this,"and she said, "Take it. That's all you're 
12
 I going to get. This is the final draft." 
13
 I Q Do you recall a discussion prior to signing this 
14
 J document or subsequent to signing it to the effect that what 
she wanted was an adjustment in the $120 amount for inflation]' 
A Only after subsequent to seeking the document. 
Q But you recall the discussion subsequent to that 
effect? 
19
 J A Yeah, talking about that paragraph, yes. 
MR. MCPHIE: Thank you. Your Honor, I move 
21
 I the admission of Defendant's Exhibits 19 and 20 in evidence. 
22
 And Defendant's Exhibits 19 and 20, they are the decree 
23
 of divorce which I don't know if the court has — it has 
24
 the separation agreement. 
25
 THE COURT: I have a copy in the file, yes. 
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1 MR. MCPHIE: Okay. An* \;o won't — and the letter] 
2 to Mr. Blackburn dated November 19th, '83 which is — 
3 THE COURT: Any objection? 
4
 MR. BERCEAU: I've never seen the letter. I'd 
5 like to read it. 
6
 THE COURT: This may be a good, time to take a 
7 recess. We'll be in recess until ten after ten. 
8 (Short recess taken.) 
9 THE COURT: Did you have a chance to read that, 
10 Mr. Berceau? 
11 MR. BERCEAU: Yes, Your Honor. I have no 
12 objection as it being offered to shoi: for the money. 
13 THE COURT: It will be received. 
14 MR. BERCEAU: As to the truth asserted therein, 
15 I do. 
16 TEE COURT: W e l l , t h a t ' s :;hc.t i t ' s — 
17 MR. MCPHIE: The — t h a t ' s t h e o n l y purpose 
18
 we offer i t . 
19 THE COURT: Certainly. It will be received. 
20 Do ycu want to resume the witness stand, Mr. 
21 Blackburn. Do you want tc proceed, !*.r. JlcPhie? 
22 o (By Kr. JicPhie) Just a couple of questions. 
23 Let me show you, again, I!r. 3Iackburn, a 
24 xeroxed copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit lTc. 5. This is the 
25
 J document in which ycu list your anticipated savings in 
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1 taxes by making the house payment. :*ou list here from a couple 
2 of different sources that you will save $408.00 a month; 
3 is that correct? 
* I A I'm not sure what you :x\ean from a couple of 
6 different sources. 
6 Q Well# you list here dividing about in the middle 
7 of the page. 
8 A Okay. 
9 Q You show $1,268 divided by 12 months equal a 105 
10 per month? 
11 A Okay. That 105 is the tax savings per month. 
12 That's the yearly tax savings then divided by 12 to get a 
13 montly tax savings. So in other words I anticipate the 
14 saving of 105 dollars per month on the income taxes. 
15 Q Could you demonstrate hov; you arrive at that 
16 figure? I'm net sure that this is self-explanatory. How 
17 did you get to the $105 a month figure in tax saved? 
18 A Okay. What I do, I take the house interest and 
19 house taxes that I have from 1978 and then I assume that will) 
20 be on itemized deduction on the federal income tax. 
21 Q So you assume this will be a deduction? 
22 A Yeah. And it will also transfer over to a state 
23 income tax as well. So then I take vhat I think is a tax 
24 rate :cor the last dollar earned times that deduction. 
25 Co in other wc::cs if I reduce the amount of income by 325, 
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1 well# then I won't be paying taxes on that amount. So I 
2 will save 39 percent of that amount if my tax rate is 39 
3 percent, and I'm usually that as a combined rate for federal 
4
 and state taxes, 
5 J Q Was that true for that year? 
6 A Not for 1978. That's my estimate of what I filed 
7 I as a single person for income taxes and assuming that I'm 
8 going to stay at working where I am and so forth. 
9 Q Did you stay working wliere you were? 
10 A No, I did not. 
11 Q What was — what income, what income level is 
12 this Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 based on? 
13 A That's based on what I thought I would be earning 
14 in 1979 by staying — 
15 Q How much did you think you would be working 
16 in 1979? 
17 A I don't remember the exact numbers. I remember 
18 I looked up some tables. I guess there would be the 1978 
19 tax tables. 
20 Q Do you remember if it was 20 and 30,000 a year? 
21 A It was around 20,000or somewhere a little over 
22 20#000 I would think because I was making about 20,000 at 
23 that time. 
24 Q Did you have$20 ,000 income i n '79? 
25 A I c o n ' t r e c a l l , but i t would b e , i f I added the 
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the house — or in '79 I don't think so. 
Q Did you have $20,000 income in 1980? 
A I'm not sure exactly — close to it. It was either 
18,000 or 20,000, right close. 4*1— ****+&) 
Q Did you have $20,000 in — $20,000 income in 1981} 
A In 1981? No. 
Q Did you have $20,000 income in 1982? 
A No. 
Q How about 1983? 
A No. 
Q How about 1984? 
A Yes, in 1984 I had over — right about $20,000, 
a little over $20,000. 
Q Now in 1984 is just last year, the year you came 
to Utah; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q And you worked how many months of 1984? 
THE COURT: Mr. McPhie, if you are not working 
with the exhibit, if you could question him from the lecturn ,| 
please. 
Q (By Mr. McPhie) How many months did you work 
in 1984? 
A I worked three in a half months, almost four 
months in 1984. 
Q You made $20,000 in those four months? 
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1 A Yes. I worked six hours a day, 12 hours a day, 
2 six days a week, time in a half, overtime. 
3 MR. MCPHIE: I have no further questions. 
4
 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Berceau: 
5 MR. BERCEAU: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: You may step down. Any more witnessed 
7 Mr. Berceau? 
8 MR. BERCEAU: I would like to call — I just have 
9 one question I'd like to call an adverse party, Your Hcnor. 
10 I'd like to call Carol Moyes. I got one question. I could 
11 ask her here while she's sitting dov/n or take the stand. 
12 THE COURT: Why don't we have her take the stand. 
13 I found these one questions usually turn into more. 
14 MR. BERCEAU: Into two questions. 
15 THE COURT: If you will take the stand, Mr. Moyesj 
16 For the record, you understand that you are still under oathj 
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
18 CAROL MOYES, 
19 Having been previously duly sworn to tell the truth, 
20 was further examined and testified as follows: 
21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. BERCEAU: 
23 Q Mrs. Mcyes, I'm trying to get a reference when 
24 was Kristin born? 
25 THE COURT: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the question 
43 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
6 
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8 
9 
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11 
12 
Q (By Mr. Berceau) When was Kristin born? 
A Born October 3rd, 1983. 
MR. BERCEAU: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. That was just one. 
Any cross-examination on that issue? 
MR. MCPHIE: Mo. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Any more witnesses] 
Mr. Berceau: 
MR. BERCEAU: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal witnesses? 
MR. MCPHIE: No. 
THE COURT: All right. You wish to be heard then,| 
1 3| Mr. McPhie? 
(Whereupon closing arguments were heard.) 
(thereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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